¹ For other forms that ‘the problem of induction’ takes, see Black, Max, ‘Induction,’ The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edwards, Paul (ed.) (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1967), Volume Four, 170 ffGoogle Scholar. It is, however, in the form with which I am dealing that the problem has primarily engrossed philosophers and with justification; for prior to asking a question like, ‘How can one induction justifiably be claimed to be better than another?’, one has to ask, ‘Can any induction be rationally justified?’

² See, for instance, Whitehead, , Science and the Modern World (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1926), 62 ff. and 252 ff.Google Scholar

³ Hume, , ‘Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding,’ Enquiries, 2nd edn, Selby-Bigge, L. A. (ed.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902), 33–34.Google Scholar

⁴ It will be remembered that as Locke officially defines qualities they are powers of, e.g., material things, to produce ideas, which (the latter) are alone directly perceived: see, Locke, , Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Fraser, A. C. (ed.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894), 169 (Book II, chap. VIII, sec. 8).Google Scholar

⁵ See, Hume, , A Treatise of Human Nature, Selby-Bigge, L. A. (ed.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888)Google Scholar, Book I, Part IV, sect. V, p. 241 (with respect to the identification of objects and impressions) and Book I, Part I, sect. VII, 19 (with respect to the particularity of impressions: ‘'tis a principle generally receiv'd in philosophy, that every thing in nature is individual’); also Book I, Part IV, sect. II, 194: ‘… all impressions are internal and perishing existences, and appear as such…’. In line with the ‘careless,’ less rigorous manner of exposition adopted in the Enquiry, these identifications are not so explicitly set forth but, with respect to what we directly perceive, they continue to be observed. Thus, instead of saying, as his official division of perceptions into either ideas or impressions would dictate, ‘I have found that such an impression has always been attended with such an effect,’ Hume says, ‘I have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect’ (op. cit., 34).

⁶ I have elsewhere argued that the translation of inductions into arguments itself generates sceptical consequences (see this author, ‘How Inductive Conclusions Can Be Certain,’ Philosophical Investigations, Vol. 3 No. 3, Summer 1980, 28–29)Google Scholar. I believe that the contentions set forth in this article sufficiently counteract the sceptical effects let loose by the translation in question to allow us to engage in it. As will be noted later, however, when considering inductions one needs to relate them, not to arguments but (in the last analysis) to the actual things and circumstances over which inductions operate.

⁷ Hume, , Enquiry, op. cit., 37.Google Scholar

⁸ For instance, Barker, Stephen F., The Elements of Logic, 2nd edn (McGraw Hill, 1974), 308Google Scholar: ‘The difficulty is that Hume thought deductive reasoning to be the only legitimate type of reasoning; when he found that inductive arguments are not deductive in nature, he rejected them as illegitimate.’

⁹ For instance, Barker, , op. cit., 73Google Scholar: ‘Similarly, “An elephant is a pachyderm” surely means “All elephants are pachyderms.”’

¹⁰ Hume, , Treatise, 16.Google Scholar

¹¹ Loc. cit.

¹² See, this author, ‘How Inductive Conclusions Can Be Certain,’ op. cit., 29 ff. What I attempt to show in more detail than I can go into here in the pages referred to is that inductions, unlike deductive arguments, have actualities and not mere conceivabilities as their points of departure and return. As a flight of fancy, for example, I can imagine that the sun will turn into a supernova ten minutes from now; but there is not the slightest actual indication of any such thing. My licence to induce is authorized by the latter condition; not the former.

¹³ See, again, this author, op. cit., 29 ff. The temptation to substitute mere imaginings for actual states of affairs in one's philosophizing about induction constantly recurs and as constantly needs to be suppressed as a piece of demonstrable nonsense.