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Intending the Impossible

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Carl G. Hedman
Carl G. Hedman
Affiliation:
Miami University, Ohio.
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Extract

Can a man intend to do the impossible? That is, can a man undertake to do some action, A—and not merely to come as close as possible to doing A with the hope that the doing of A will result—when he believes he has no chance of doing A?

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Type
Articles
Information
Philosophy , Volume 45 , Issue 171 , January 1970 , pp. 33 - 38
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1970

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References

1 I will not be concerned with asking the question: Can one intend to do what one knows to be impossible? where “knows” is taken in the strong sense where it entails the truth of what is known. In this paper I will only be asking: Can a man intend to do and not just wish for something when he has what he takes to be sufficient grounds for believing he cannot do it? Nor will I be arguing at any point that a man can go after what he takes to be logically impossible, e.g. drawing a square circle.

2 Hampshire gives his answer in Thought and Action (1959)Google Scholar and developes it in Freedom of the Individual (1965)Google Scholar. Thalberg gives his answer in the paper, “Intending the Impossible”, AJP, vol. 40 (1962), pp. 49–56.Google Scholar

3 It would seem that such men should be added to Urmson's list of “heroes” for they surely engage in “higher flights of morality” than those of us who guide our life by what in “universally expected”. (“Saints and Heroes” in Essays in Moral Philosophy (1958)).Google Scholar

4 Intention (Cornell University Press, 1966) p. 94Google Scholar. I cite Miss Anscombe's example just to make the point at hand; I am not concerned with trying to suggest how she would answer our opening question.