^{page 4 note 1} Salmond, , Jurisprudence (8th edition), pp. 39 ffGoogle Scholar.

^{page 4 note 2} Ibid., pp. 58 ff.

^{page 5 note 1} The distinction here drawn between ‘civil’ and ‘criminal,’ while sufficiently accurate for our purposes, is not entirely correct. See Kenny, , Outlines of Criminal Law (14th edition), chap. iGoogle Scholar.

^{page 6 note 1} Oppenheim, , International Law, vol. ii (5th edition), p. 4 note, and p. 64Google Scholar.

^{page 8 note 1} This section and the following section on “Rights and Interests” are summary statements of conclusions at which I have arrived from a much more elaborate consideration of rights and duties in a work as yet unpublished.

^{page 8 note 2} I am aware that my view on this point is not universally accepted; but its soundness can be completely demonstrated. The argument is, however, too lengthy to be included in this paper.

^{page 13 note 1} Mr. Mabbott, arguing in favour of a Retributive theory of punishment, asserts (Mind, 04 1939, pp. 161–164Google Scholar) that punishment is a corollary of law-breaking, and that a legislator does not choose whether he shall punish breaches of the law. This assertion is quite inconsistent with the facts. The vast majority of ‘civil’ actions aim at proving breach of law and securing reparation, the question of punishment not being raised at all.

^{page 15 note 1} For somewhat more elaborate treatment of this subject—from the ethical and legal aspects—the reader should consult the excellent article by DrEwing, A. C. in Mind, 07 1927Google Scholar, and the first few chapters of Kenny's Criminal Law.

^{page 15 note 2} Kenny, (Criminal Law, p. 4)Google Scholar asserts that rights are not always involved, but the instances he gives are, to my mind, cases in which rights are clearly involved.