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The Language of Controversy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Extract

There are, plainly, very many reasons why a controversy should be inconclusive and abortive, and yet constantly reviving. It might, for example, be one that interests only the very stupid or prejudiced; or one that interests everyone deeply, demanding an answer of everyone, yet not yielding any really decisive evidence; or the controversy might be one in which thesis and antithesis are natural expressions of opposed psychological types (“Tough-” and “Tender-minded” people); or it might be one that is commonly conducted in terms that are vague, misleading, and question-begging. In this paper I shall confine myself to the last of these reasons: the use of language which makes it extremely difficult to understand what either of the parties are really asserting, and where, if at all, they contradict each other. I hope I shall not be thought to exaggerate the importance of this familiar factor, but I hope to show that in many important controversies the best will in the world and all the patience and tolerance a man can muster are not sufficient: special training and considerable independent reflection are necessary if the debate in question is not to prove as profitless as those described by Omar Khayyam of Naishapur:

Myself when young did eagerly frequent

Doctor and Saint, and heard great Argument

About it and about: but evermore

Came out by the same Door as in I went.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1941

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References

page 414 note 1 On Indeterminacy of Degree, see M. Black, Philosophy of Science; on Ambiguity, see I. A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric and Interpretation in Teaching.