Skip to main content
×
Home
    • Aa
    • Aa

The Linguistic View of a Priori Knowledge

  • M. Giaquinto (a1)
Abstract
Abstract

This paper presents considerations against the linguistic view of a priori knowledge. The paper has two parts. In the first part I argue that problems about the individuation of lexical meanings provide evidence for a moderate indeterminacy, as distinct from the radical indeterminacy of meaning claimed by Quine, and that this undermines the idea of a priori knowledge based on knowledge of synonymies. In the second part of the paper I argue against the idea that a priori knowledge not based on knowledge of synonymies can be explained in terms of implicit definitions.1

Copyright
References
Hide All
Paul Boghossian , ‘Analyticity Reconsidered.’ Nous (1996), 360391

D. Geeraerts , ‘Vagueness's puzzles, polysemy's vagaries’, Cognitive Linguistics 1993, 223272

Quine , ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism.’ Philosophical Review (1951), 2043

H. Putnam Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, volume 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press1975

Quine , ‘On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation.’ Journal of Philosophy (1970), 178183

Horwich , ‘Stipulation, Meaning, and Apriority’ in P. Boghossian and C. Peacocke (eds.) New Essays on the A Priori. (Oxford: Oxford University Press2000)

Horwich , Reflections on Meaning. (Oxford: Oxford University Press2005)

Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

Philosophy
  • ISSN: 0031-8191
  • EISSN: 1469-817X
  • URL: /core/journals/philosophy
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *
×

Metrics

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 3
Total number of PDF views: 14 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 96 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between September 2016 - 19th October 2017. This data will be updated every 24 hours.