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Logical Necessity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Stuart Hampshire
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Extract

It may sometimes be useful in philosophy to state a method of argument in very simple and even over-simplified terms; it may at a certain stage be useful to ignore for the moment the details and difficulties of particular philosophical arguments, and to try to state simply what is commonly assumed in a variety of different and even opposing arguments.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 23 , Issue 87 , October 1948 , pp. 332 - 345
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1948

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References

page 335 note 1 It may not be, probably is not, the mathematician's motive. I suppose that a pure mathematician is ordinarily interested in logical relations for their own sake.

page 339 note 1 Heidegger and the Existentialists are typical examples.

page 341 note 1 It is bad (logical) grammar to speak of a rule as being true or false. What is true or false is the statement that it is a rule.

page 344 note 1 A contradiction arises when rules conflict; rules conflict when one rule suggests that you may say p, another that you cannot say p. A third rule is then required to delimit the application of the other two.