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⁸ Among encouraging recent signs of the emergence of a robust form of consequentialism I note especially David Sosa, ‘Consequences of Consequentialism’, Mind 102 (405), January 1993, 101–122.Google Scholar

⁹ Most of the relevant work–with the exception of Slote&s book,Common-Sense Morality and Consequentialism(London: Routledge and Kegan l, 1985)–is to be found in Philip Pettit (ed.), Consequentialism(Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Co., 1993).Google Scholar

¹⁰ See for example Samuel Scheffler's essay The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982) and his edited collection Consequentialism and its Critics (Oxford University Press, 1988).Google Scholar

¹¹ Amartya, Sen and Bernard, Williams, (eds),Utilitarianism and Beyond(Cambridge University Press, 1982),3–4.Google Scholar

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¹³ Frances Howard-Snyder, ‘Elbow Room for Consequentialists’,Analysis 52, 4, October 1992, 249.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford University Press,1986)24Google Scholar

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¹⁶ Ohlsson, Ragnar, in ‘Who Can Accept Moral Dilemmas?’ (Journal of Philosophy, 90,8, 405–415 (August 1993)), argues similarly that tolerating dilemmas of this sort does not necessarily count against the validity of a moral theoryGoogle Scholar

¹⁷ Some useful arguments in this direction, which I do not pursue further here, are to be found in Liam B., Murphy, ‘The Demands of Beneficence’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 22,4, Fall 1993,267–292Google Scholar

¹⁸ Michael Slote uses a version ofthis argument in his discussion ‘satisficing consequentialism’. See Common-Sense Morality and Consequentialism,36.Google Scholar

¹⁹ See in this connection ‘The Origins of Right and Wrong’, my review of Charles Fried, Right and Wrong (Harvard University Press, 1978) in The Hastings Centre Report, 8, 6, December 1978, 43–5Google Scholar

²⁰ In the language of my Science and the Theory of Value, moral theories (like theories of Value generally) serve for the ‘rectification of desire’, as scientific theories serve for the ‘rectification of experience’.Google Scholar

²¹ Donagan, Alan,The Theory of Morality(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 190.Google Scholar

²² Caws, Peter, ‘A Negative Interpretation of the Causal Principle’ inYorick&s World: Science and the Knowing Subject(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), 154–161Google Scholar

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²⁴ Caws, Peter, Science and the Theory of Value (New York:RandomHouse, 1967),122.Google Scholar

²⁵ Op. cit, passim. See also Peter Caws, Ethics From Experience (Boston: Jones and Bartlett, 1985), Ch. VII.Google Scholar

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