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Open-mindedness as a Corrective Virtue

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 December 2020

Hassan Alsharif  and
John Symons
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Abstract

This paper argues that open-mindedness is a corrective virtue. It serves as a corrective to the epistemic vice of confirmation bias. Specifically, open-mindedness is the epistemically virtuous disposition to resist the negative effects of confirmation bias on our ability to reason well and to evaluate evidence and arguments. As part of the defense and presentation of our account, we explore four discussions of open-mindedness in the recent literature. All four approaches have strengths and shed light on aspects of the virtue of open-mindedness. Each mentions various symptoms of confirmation bias and some explore aspects of the corrective role of open-mindedness. However, ours is the first to explicitly identify open-mindedness as a corrective virtue to the specific epistemic vice of confirmation bias. We show how the corrective account also permits a response to the concern that open-mindedness might not actually count as a virtue.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 96 , Issue 1 , January 2021 , pp. 73 - 97
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Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy, 2020

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