^{page 242 note 1} From the juristic point of view, possession, i.e. the fact of exercising power over an object, is, under certain conditions, generative of the right of property. In this sense, to possess is equivalent to exercising a real right over an object, it being immaterial whether this right has been recognized or not.

^{page 246 note 1} In Macaulay's Works, I came across the opinion expressed by the great English historian on the relation which existed between Mr. Bentham and M. Dumont. “Theraw material,” says Macaulay, “which Mr. Bentham furnished was most precious; but it was unmarketable. He was, assuredly, at once a great logician and a great rhetorician. But the effect of his logic was injured by a vicious arrangement and the effect of his rhetoric by a vicious style. His mind was vigorous, comprehensive, subtle, fertile of arguments, fertile of illustrations. But he spoke in an unknown tongue; and, that the congregation might be edified, it was necessary that some brother having the gift of interpretation should expound the invaluable jargon … M. Dumont was admirably qualified to supply what was wanting in Mr. Bentham” (Vol. V, p. 613).

^{page 250 note 1} For more detailed development of possession in animal psychology, see my “Is there an Instinct of Possession?” (The British Journal of Psychology, 07 1942)Google Scholar.

^{page 251 note 1} According to the author of the Natural Origins of Ownership (Brussels, 1908)Google Scholar property is a natural fact responding to the necessities of adaptation and applicable also to the animal and vegetable worlds (pp. 1 and 3, Chapter VI, and conclusion, p. 219). Thus for Petrucci, every object must be considered as the true owner of the space it occupies.