^{page 246 note 1} Wilhelm Dilthey, An Introduction. Paul, Kegan, 1944Google Scholar.

^{page 247 note 1} The Journal of Philosophy, vol. XLII, 1945, pp. 65 ff.Google Scholar

^{page 247 note 2} Cp. for details Dilthey, 's most brilliant essay, “Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften,” WW, VII, pp. 88 ffGoogle Scholar. I accept “human studies” as a translation of Geisteswissenschaften, cp. Hodges, L.c., p. 157.

^{page 247 note 1} Über die Religion, WW, IV, p. 270 (Leipzig, 1914)Google Scholar. The identification of wisdom and history anticipates the identity of philosophy and history of philosophy (Hegel) and that of philosophy and history (Croce).

^{page 247 note 2} Werke, ed. Medicus, , Vol. I, p. 317Google Scholar.

^{page 247 note 3} L.c., p. 208.

^{page 247 note 4} L.c., p. 415.

^{page 247 note 5} Works, I, 1, p. 382–83.

^{page 247 note 6} Collingwood, R. G., An Autobiography, ch. XGoogle Scholar.

^{page 247 note 7} Works, I, 5, 306.

^{page 249 note 1} L.c., p. 309.

^{page 249 note 2} Cp. Philosophy, 1945, pp. 81 ff.

^{page 250 note 1} Troeltsch, E., Der Historismus u. seine Probleme, 1922, pp. 333 ff.; 347, 490Google Scholar.

^{page 250 note 2} Cp. Heinemann, F., Neue Wege der Philosophie, 1929, pp. 186, 190 ffGoogle Scholar.

^{page 250 note 3} Dilthey, , Werke, 8, 232Google Scholar.

^{page 251 note 1} Cp. my above-quoted book, pp. 273, 374, 384 ff.

^{page 252 note 1} First Principles, p. 546.

^{page 253 note 1} An Autobiography, Penguin, p. 52Google Scholar.

^{page 253 note 2} Logic, Engl, ed., p. 324.

^{page 253 note 3} Cp. for Croce's relativism Mandelbaum, M., The Problem of Historical Knowledge, N.Y., 1938Google Scholar.

^{page 254 note 1} Cp. for his positive contribution my above-quoted work and Prof. Hodges' excellent book.

^{page 256 note 1} Note added during the revision. My attention has been drawn to the discussion of historicism in Popper, K. R.'s Open Society and Its Enemies, 1945Google Scholar. Everyone is entitled to use terms as he pleases. But Popper's use of the word historicism as denoting social philosophies which regard history as controlled by developmental laws enabling us to predict man's future seems rather arbitrary. Under its aegis Plato and Aristotle are written off as “historicists” in spite of the fact that they do not accept historical knowledge as true knowledge. Mr. Popper's remarks about essential definition are interesting and help us to understand Hegel's identification of philosophy with its history; but it is in no way necessary that this sort of definition, or rather a specific kind of it, namely genetic definition, should lead to historicism. Mr. Popper overlooks Proclus who forms a most important link between Plato–Aristotle and Hegel and who formulates most precise developmental laws without becoming an historicist in any sense of the word. The cyclical movement of his system has nothing to do with history. This use of the word historicism, which cannot account for the facts of history, should therefore not be accepted as genuine. The word should be used, with Professor Hodges, as a translation of the German Historismus which Mr. Popper translates by “historism,” meaning by it “the method of treating philosophies or religions entirely from the point of view of their historical origin and environment”; this comes nearer to the true meaning of historicism.—As to the refutation of the epistemonological thesis of historicism which had to be as short as possible for lack of space, the following points which may be further developed should be kept in mind. (1) The dependence of some parts of our knowledge on either biological, psychological, social, economic, practical, or historical factors is not denied. The mistake of historicism and all these one-sided standpoints lies in faulty generalization. (2) Judgments which are completely dependent on any of these prelogical spheres are not strictly speaking knowledge, but pseudo-knowledge, because they are based on prelogical affirmation or negation (e.g. journalistic articles hiding the interests of a specific group behind pseudo-scientific language). (3) Moreover, the assumed relations of one-sided dependence are in fact relations of interdependence; the sphere of economics, for instance, depends as much on thought as thought on economics. (4) All these factors, biological, social, historical, etc., do not act in isolation but in interdependence and thereby counterbalance each other.