¹ Carol, Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 28–35.Google Scholar

² Gilligan, pp. 38, 57.

³ The sharpness of rights thinking is also expressed in a ‘logic of fairness’ (Gilligan, p. 32) according to which having a right appears to entail that it is to be honoured whatever the circumstances.Google Scholar The softer view that it does not follow logically from having a right that the object of the right must be accorded is expressed by Judith Jarvis, Thompson, The Realm of Rights (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 120.Google Scholar

⁴ Cf. Onora, O'Neill, Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 191–192.Google Scholar The difficulty for rights thinkers is evident in Robert, Nozick'sAnarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), where in place of a duty of charity there is only the right to help the needy.Google Scholar

⁵ David, Lyons, ‘Utility and Rights’, in Waldron, J., ed., Theories of Rights (Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 127.Google Scholar

⁶ Cf. Lyons, p. 133.

⁷ Thus Jonathan, Dancy, ‘Caring About Justice’. Philosophy 67 (1992), 447–466, pp. 454–455.Google Scholar

⁸ See Jeremy, Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies,Google Scholar as excerpted in Jeremy, Waldron, Nonsense upon Stilts: Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man (London: Methuen, 1987), p. 68.Google Scholar

⁹ Compare Elizabeth, Wolgast, ‘Wrong Rights’, Hypatia, 2 (1987), 25–43, p. 39.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Austin, J. L., ‘Truth’, in Philosophical Papers (Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 85Google Scholar

¹¹ See Hart, H. L. A., ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’, in Waldron, Theories of Rights, pp. 84-88.Google Scholar

¹² Summer, L. W., The Moral Foundation of Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 1.Google Scholar

¹³ Roger, Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1980), p. 50.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Mary Ann, Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (New York: The Free Press, 1991), p. x.Google ScholarSince Sumner is Canadian and Scruton British, one would like a fuller account of her further perception that ‘there must be a … specifically American explanation … for the persistent absoluteness in rights talk that is still more common in the United States than elsewhere’ (p. 42).Google Scholar

¹⁵ John, Hardwig, ‘Should Women Think in Terms of Rights?’, in Feminism & Political Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), p. 56.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Cf. Meyer, Michael J., ‘Rights Between Friends’, Journal of Philosophy 69 (1992), 467–483, p. 477 and 481.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁷ Thus, Elizabeth, Wolgast, ‘Wrong Rights’, p. 37. Cf. Hardwig, p. 57.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Lawrence, Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981), pp. 155, 166–167.Google Scholar

¹⁹ This point is developed in Evan, Simpson, Good Lives and Moral Education (New York: Peter Lang, 1989), pp. 151–15.Google Scholar

²⁰ The distinction between rhetoric and substance is drawn by Alasdair, Maclntyre in ‘The Privatization of Good’, The Review of Politics, 52 (1990), 344–361, p. 349.Google Scholar

²¹ Cf. Joseph, Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 165.Google Scholar

²² On ‘manifesto rights’ see Joel, Feinberg, ‘The Nature and Value of Rights’, in Rights, Justice and the Bounds of Liberty (Princeton University Press, 1980).Google Scholar Short of conflating rights and needs, one can of course argue that ‘People have a right to what they need’, as claimed in the opening sentence of Evan, Simpson, ‘The Priority of Needs over Wants’, Social Theory and Practice, 9 (1982), pp. 95–112.Google Scholar

²³ The Charter, of which this is Article 24, is reprinted in Peter, C. M., ed., Human Rights in Africa (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1990), pp. 103–116.Google Scholar

²⁴ Theoretical foundations for such a view are constructed by Melinda, Vadis, ‘A First Look at the Pornography/Civil Rights Ordnance: Could Pornography Be the Subordination of Women?’, Journal of Philosophy, 84 (1987), pp. 487–511.Google Scholar

²⁵ Cf. Parent, W. A., ‘A Second Look at Pornography and the Subordination of Women’, Journal of Philosophy, 87 (1990), 205–211, p.211.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁶ Charles, Taylor, ‘Atomism’, in his Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 188–189.Google Scholar

²⁷ For a useful discussion of rights prior to the 17th century, see Brian, Tierney, ‘Origins of Natural Rights Language: Text and Contexts, 1150-1250’, History of Political Thought, 10 (1989), pp. 615–646.Google Scholar

²⁸ Annette, Baier, Moral Prejudices (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 226Google Scholar

²⁹ Edmund, Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 120.Google Scholar

³⁰ Compare Larmore's, Charles E. ‘praise of bureaucracy’ in Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge University Press, 1987) pp. 40–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³¹ On the rule of right that is a paramount good in liberal societies see Charles, Taylor, ‘Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate’, in Rosenblum, Nancy L., Liberalism and the Moral Life (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 172ff.;Google Scholar and Ronald, Dworkin, ‘Liberal Community’, California Law Review 77 (1989), 479-504.Google Scholar

³² John, Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), pp. 60–65, 150–161.Google Scholar

³³ Robert, Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 164-166.Google Scholar

³⁴ For one account of this general type see Sterba, James P., ‘From Liberty to Welfare’, Ethics 105 (1994), pp. 64–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁵ Flathman, Richard E., The Practice of Rights (Cambridge University Press, 1976). My quotations are from pages 165 and 220.Google Scholar

³⁶ Thus Don, MacNiven asks seriously, ‘does Mars have a right to be left in its natural state?’, Creative Morality (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 203.Google ScholarKim Stanley, Robinson develops the nice irony of casting the green party as the anti-environmental party in his novel, Red Mars (New York: Bantam Books, 1993).Google Scholar

³⁷ For another statement of the sufficiency of a practice-view see Dworkin, , ‘Liberal Community’.Google Scholar

³⁸ Thus Baier, , Moral Prejudices, pp. 238-239.Google Scholar

³⁹ Iris Marion, Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 41 and p. 163.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ For a clear statement of the idea that the general advantage may be promoted by the existence of privileged strata, see John, Rawls's explication of democratic equality in A Theory of Justice, pp. 75-83.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Cf. the characterization of group rights by Iris, Young in Justice and the Politics of Difference, pp. 182-186.Google Scholar

⁴² The freedom of each generation to determine its future for itself is an idea that runs through rights thinkers from Thomas, Paine, in The Rights of Man,Google Scholar to Jürgen, Habermas, in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, ed by Amy, Gutmann (Princeton University Press, 1994), pp.130–131.Google Scholar

⁴³ Singer, Beth J., Operative Rights (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), pp. xiii-xv.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Ibid. pp. 62, 97.

⁴⁵ Jürgen, Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), p. 202.Google Scholar