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Self-deception: A Reflexive Dilemma

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2009

T. S. Champlin
Affiliation:
University of Hull

Extract

It is not easy to see how self-deception is possible because the man who deceives himself seems to be required to play two incompatible roles, that of deceiver and that of deceived. This makes self-deception sound about as difficult as presiding at one's own funeral. Many attempts have been made to remove the air of paradox from self-deception. These attempts are all unsuccessful, and they are best seen as expressions of philosophical puzzlement rather than as actual solutions. In particular, the whole of the literature on self-deception is vitiated by two serious confusions. First, deception is confused with deceit; secondly, it is wrongly assumed that every case of deceiving oneself is automatically a case of self-deception and so self-deception proper becomes confused with other things.

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Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1977

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