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  • Cited by 3
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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Mccready-Flora, Ian 2014. Aristotle's Cognitive Science: Belief, Affect and Rationality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 89, Issue. 2, p. 394.

    Jacobson, Hilla 2010. Normativity without reflectivity: On the beliefs and desires of non-reflective creatures. Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 23, Issue. 1, p. 75.

    Chadha, Monima 2007. No Speech, Never Mind!. Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 20, Issue. 5, p. 641.


Some More Thoughts About Thought and Talk: Davidson and Fellows on Animal Belief


Donald Davidson's argument that non-linguistic creatures lack beliefs rests on two premises: (1) to be a believer, one must have the concept of belief, and (2) to have the concept of belief, one must interpret the utterances of others. However, Davidson's defense of these premises is overly compressed and unconvincing. In a recent issue of Philosophy, Roger Fellows provides new arguments for these premises. In this paper, I explain why I'm not persuaded by Fellows' attempt to bolster Davidson's line of reasoning and cast doubt on Davidson's and Fellows' overall strategy of attaching special significance to the concept of belief.

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  • ISSN: 0031-8191
  • EISSN: 1469-817X
  • URL: /core/journals/philosophy
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