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This dialogue concerns metasemantics and language cognition. It defends a Lewisian conception of languages as abstract entities (Lewis 1975), arguing that semantic facts are necessities (Soames 1984), and therefore not naturalistically reducible. It identifies spoken languages as idiolects, in line roughly with Chomskyan I-languages. It relocates traditional metasemantic indeterminacy arguments as indeterminacies of what language an agent speaks or cognizes. Finally, it aims to provide a theoretical analysis of the cognizing relation in terms of the agent's assigning certain meanings to strings.
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