¹ Cf. Williams, B. A. O., ‘Personal Identity and Individuation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society LVII, 1956–1957Google Scholar and ‘Are Persons Bodies?’ in The Philosophy of the Body, ed. Spicker, Stuart (Chicago, 1970)Google Scholar; Ayer, A. J., ‘The Concept of a Person’, in The Concept of a Person and Other Essays (New York, 1963)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Shoemaker, S., Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity (Ithaca, New York, 1963)Google Scholar; Penelhum, T., Survival and Disembodied Existence (London, 1970).Google Scholar

² Locke, , Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Ch. XXVIIGoogle Scholar. Butler, , The Analogy of ReligionGoogle Scholar, Appendix I. For an excellent analysis of what can be said in Locke's defence, see Wiggins, David, ‘John Locke on Persons and their Memories: A Physicalist Account’, forthcoming.Google Scholar

³ Cf. Martin, C. B. and Deutscher, Max, ‘Remembering’, Philosophical Review, LXXV, 1966Google Scholar, and Shoemaker, S., ‘Persons and their Pasts’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 1970.Google Scholar

⁴ The richest documentation of this is, of course, Remembrance of Things Past. Even when Marcel recaptures the very taste of the madeleine, the memory carries resonances his experiences did not have: the resonance of all the intermediate experiences and the mediating search for the original. When he recaptures it, it is embedded at the core of the crystal that has grown around it; in a sense he has the original at the core, but he can never see it or savour it without the crystalline structure that has formed around it. See also Bradley, , Appearance and Reality (Oxford, 1920), 71–73Google Scholar, and Hampshire, Stuart, ‘Dispositions and Memory’, Freedom of Mind (Princeton, 1971, 160–182).Google Scholar

⁵ Cf. Shorter, J. M., ‘Personal Identity, Personal Relationships and Criteria’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1970–1971Google Scholar, and Emmet, Dorothy, ‘Persons and Personae’, Rules, Roles and Relations (New York, 1966).Google Scholar

⁶ Hume, , Treatise, Book 2, Part IV, Ch. 6Google Scholar; Parfit, D., ‘Personal Identity’, Philosophical Review, 01, 1970Google Scholar; Perry, John, ‘Can the Self Divide?’, The Journal of Philosophy vol. LXIX, No. 16, 1972.Google Scholar

⁷ Cf. Wiggins, David, Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity (Oxford, 1967), see especially 43–58.Google Scholar

⁸ I have tried to develop this argument in ‘Essential Possibilities in the Actual World’, The Review of Metaphysics, 1972.Google Scholar

⁹ For a firm and careful attempt to distinguish various types of criteria for identification, and to discuss their relationships, see Woods, M. J., ‘Identity and Individuation’, in Butler, R. (ed.) Analytical Philosophy, Second Series (Oxford, 1965).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Cf. Wiggins, David, op. cit.Google Scholar, and Geach, Peter, ‘Identity’, The Review of Metaphysics, 21, 1967Google Scholar. Since the serious differences between Wiggins and Geach do not affect my analysis, I shall not discuss them here.

¹¹ For an excellent analysis of Leibniz's position on identity, see Hacking, Ian, ‘Individual Substance’ in Leibniz: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Frankfurt, Harry (New York, 1972)Google Scholar. Saul Kripke develops a closely related view in ‘Naming and Necessity’, Semantics of Natural Language, ed. Davidson, and Harman, (Dordrecht, Holland, 1972)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Kripke shows how identity statements are corrigible.

¹² It might be thought that the criteria for individual differentiation and re-identification would exhaust individual identification. But the characteristics that distinguish and re-identify individuals may be criteria that are not considered significant in identifying a person as the sort of person he essentially is. For instance, fingerprints may successfully differentiate and re-identify persons for some purposes, and yet an individual might consider himself, and be considered by others, as essentially unchanged even if we found some way of changing his fingerprints without scars.

¹³ Cf. Durkheim, E., The Rules of Sociological Method (Chicago, 1938).Google Scholar

¹⁴ Cf. Frankfurt, Harry, ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of Person’, The Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁵ I have argued a similar point in ‘Naturalism, Paradigms and Ideology’, The Review of Metaphysics, 1971.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Read, K., ‘Morality and the Concept of the Person among the Gahuku-Gama’, in Myth and Cosmos, ed. Middleton, John (New York, 1967).Google Scholar

¹⁷ The literature on this subject is vast. An excellent source is Magic, Witchcraft and Healing, ed. Middleton, John (New York, 1967)Google Scholar. For a subtle and brilliant analysis of the ramifications of such practices, see Humphrey, Caroline, Magical Drawings in the Religion of the Buryat, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1972.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Cf. Read, , op. cit.Google Scholar; Fortes, Meyer, ‘Totem and Taboo’, Proceedings of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 1966.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Cf. Williams, B. A. O., op. cit. in n. 1.Google Scholar

²⁰ This paper was originally read at meetings of the Moral Sciences Club at the University of Cambridge and the Philosophy Society of the University of Sussex. I am grateful to participants at these meetings for lively discussion and trenchant criticisms.