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  • Cited by 7
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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Nelkin, Dana Kay and Rickless, Samuel C. 2015. So Close, Yet So Far: Why Solutions to the Closeness Problem for the Doctrine of Double Effect Fall Short. Noûs, Vol. 49, Issue. 2, p. 376.


    Allmark, Peter Cobb, Mark Liddle, B. Jane and Tod, Angela Mary 2010. Is the doctrine of double effect irrelevant in end-of-life decision making?. Nursing Philosophy, Vol. 11, Issue. 3, p. 170.


    Hills, Alison 2007. Intentions, foreseen consequences and the doctrine of double effect. Philosophical Studies, Vol. 133, Issue. 2, p. 257.


    Boniolo, Giovanni and De Anna, Gabriele 2006. The four faces of omission. Philosophical Explorations, Vol. 9, Issue. 3, p. 277.


    Tollefsen, Christopher 2006. Is A Purely First Person Account Of Human Action Defensible?. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 9, Issue. 4, p. 441.


    Oderberg, David S. 2005. Philosophical Reflections on Medical Ethics.


    Räikkä, Juha and Ahteensuu, Marko 2005. The Role of Prohibitions in Ethics. The Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. 39, Issue. 1, p. 27.


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Two Distinctions that do make a Difference: The Action/Omission Distinction and the Principle of Double Effect

Abstract

The paper outlines and explores a possible strategy for defending both the action/omission distinction (AOD) and the principle of double effect (PDE). The strategy is to argue that there are degrees of actionhood, and that we are in general less responsible for what has a lower degree of actionhood, because of that lower degree. Moreover, what we omit generally has a lower degree of actionhood than what we actively do, and what we do under known-but-not-intended descriptions generally has a lower degree of actionhood than what we do under known-and-intended descriptions. Therefore, we are in general less responsible for what we omit than for what we do—which is just what AOD says. And we are in general less responsible for what we do under known-but-not-intended descriptions than for what we do under known-and-intended descriptions—which is just what PDE says.

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Philosophy
  • ISSN: 0031-8191
  • EISSN: 1469-817X
  • URL: /core/journals/philosophy
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