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The Voluntariness of Virtue – and Belief

  • James A. Montmarquet (a1)

This paper examines the relative voluntariness of three types of virtue: ‘epistemic’ virtues like open-mindedness; ‘motivational’ virtues like courage, and more robustly ‘moral’ virtues like justice. A somewhat novel conception of the voluntariness of belief is offered in terms of the limited, but quite real, voluntariness of certain epistemic virtues.

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Ernest Sosa , Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991)

Linda Zagzebski , The Virtues of the Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)

Angela M. Smith , Ethics 115 (2005), 236–71

Holly Smith , ‘Culpable Ignorance’, Philosophical Review 92 (1983), 543–71

Margery Naylor , ‘Voluntary Belief’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (1985), 427–36

Mark Leon , ‘Responsible Believers’, The Monist 85 (2002), 421–36

Nishi Shah , ‘Clearing Space for Doxastic Voluntarism’, The Monist 85 (2002), 436446

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  • ISSN: 0031-8191
  • EISSN: 1469-817X
  • URL: /core/journals/philosophy
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