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When Should Philosophers Be Silent?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2012
Abstract
Are there general precepts governing when philosophers should not conduct inquiry on a given topic? When, if ever, should a philosopher just be silent? In this paper we look at a number of practical, epistemic, and moral arguments for philosophical silence. Some are quite general, and suggest that it is best never to engage in philosophical inquiry, while others are more domain – or context – specific. We argue that these arguments fail to establish their conclusions. We do, however, try to identify and defend several substantive constraints on philosophical dialogue and inquiry. In practice, though, respecting these constraints needn't lead to much philosophical silence.
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- Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2012
References
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20 It's perhaps worth noting that even if a topic is nonexistent or ineffable, this might not be enough to force philosophers into silence. There is, for example, Plato's puzzling reference in the Republic to the good being beyond existence and Quine's puzzling claim in Word and Object that while linguistic meanings don't exist, if they had existed, the Verification Criterion of Meaning would have characterized them. There are even philosophers who hold that impossibilities can be conceived and discussed. This is not implausible, since, at the very least, one ought to be able to construct meaningful reductio arguments against impossibilia and evaluate substantive indicative and counterfactual conditionals with impossible antecedents.
21 Now is as good a time as any for us to caution that any claims we make about Wittgenstein (both early and late) are subject to contradiction by Wittgenstein scholars – such being the penalty for attributions to Wittgenstein (to adapt a phrase from Quine).
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Ontology is a vehicle that one shouldn't want to take – you're not going to get very far riding a stinking horse corpse! – but it's at least a vehicle with a storied history. It used to be useful for getting interesting places, even if it was getting there in a confused way. It can at least be admired for that (and presumably discussed in the context of a historical investigation of its uses).
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