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Why should I be Moral?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 February 2009
Extract
It first needs to be shown that this question raises a problem, for many people think it is answered, or at least dissolved, in the following way. There are two independent ways of answering the question “Why should I do X?”; one ultimately in terms of what I want to do, the other ultimately in terms of what I morally ought to do. Thus showing that I morally ought to do something is a final justification of a course of action. No answer can be given to the further question “Given that X is what I morally ought to do, why ought I to do X?”. No further moral reasons can be given as ex hypothese the final moral reasons have already been given. As it is denied that moral reasons can be reduced to reasons in terms of what I want to do, the only other possible kind of reason has been ruled out also. This, however, is said net to matter, because moral reasons are not in need cf any further justification. Moral considerations simply are reasons for action just as much as wanting to do something simply is a reason for doing it.
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- Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1970
References
1 “Can the Moral Point of View be Justified?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 42, 1964, p. 22.Google Scholar
2 The expression “basic wants” is used to refer to those wants which, out of a given person's total set of wants, that person considers the most important to satisfy. The application of this expression therefore depends upon a person's own set of preferences for satisfying various wants. The expression is not intended to refer to some fixed list of wants, including, for example, the want to preserve one's own life, or the want for human companionship, though it is to be expected that, as a matter of fact, such wants would turn out to be among the basic wants of most persons.
3 The expression “moral community” is used to refer to a group of persons who subscribe to common moral rules.
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