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Wrongdoing and Forgiveness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2009

Joanna North
Joanna North
Affiliation:
Birkbeck College, London
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To forgive a person for a wrong he has done has often been valued as morally good and as indicative of a benevolent and merciful character. But while forgiveness has been recognized as valuable its nature as a moral response has largely been ignored by modern moral philosophers who work outside the confines of a religious context.1 Where it has been discussed, forgiveness has been thought particularly difficult to define, and some have thought the forgiving response paradoxical or even impossible. I shall discuss some of these difficulties and suggest firstly that the value of forgiveness lies in the fact that it essentially requires a recognition of the wrongdoer's responsibility for his action, and secondly that forgiveness typically involves an effort on the part of the one wronged: a conscious attempt to improve oneself in relation to the wrongdoer.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 62 , Issue 242 , October 1987 , pp. 499 - 508
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1987

References

1 Two notable exceptions are Aurel, Kolnai's ‘Forgiveness’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1973–1974, and R. S., Downie's ‘Forgiveness’ in Philosophical Quarterly, 15, No. 59, 1965.Google Scholar

2 St Luke, 15, xxiv.

3 Anne C., Minas deals with some of these in her article ‘God and Forgiveness’, Philosophical Quarterly, 25, No. 99, 1975.Google Scholar