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Assuming the Conclusions: Risk Assessment in the Development of Cancer Policy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2016

Mark E. Rushefsky
Mark E. Rushefsky*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science and Philosophy, Southwest Missouri State University, Springfield, Missouri 65804-0094
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Abstract

This article examines the development of generic cancer risk assessment guidelines, or cancer policy, from 1976-1984. Risk assessment is considered the objective determination of the degree of risk from a substance. Risk management is the subjective determination of acceptable risk. However, uncertainties in the scientific foundations of cancer policy necessitate risk assessment inference choices, for example, over appropriate dose-response extrapolation models. Those choices are only partially scientific; they are also partially political. There is, as a result, an inevitable mixture of facts and values in cancer policy. The article explores ten inference controversies and evaluates how nine cancer policy documents resolved those controversies. It then traces the course of cancer policy development, showing how the Carter and Reagan administrations produced policies with difference emphases and considers several major challenges to cancer policy. The article then provides several justifications for cancer policy in the face of those challenges. It suggests, in the conclusion, that the controversies are unlikely to be resolved by science alone and politics will continue to influence the content of cancer policies.

Type
Articles and Commentaries
Information
Politics and the Life Sciences , Volume 4 , Issue 1 , August 1985 , pp. 31 - 44
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Politics and the Life Sciences 

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References

Notes

1. The Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group was established in 1977 during the Carter administration to “seek a common approach to their [agencies'] scientific and regulatory problems” (Clark, , 1979, p. 1809). The group was composed of the Consumer Products Safety Commission, the Food and Drug Administration, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the Environmental Protection Agency. It was disbanded during the Reagan administration.Google Scholar

2. The American Industrial Health Council is a chemical industry association formed in 1977 in response to the OSHA guidelines.Google Scholar

3. The Toxic Substances Strategy Committee was established by the Council on Environmental Quality in 1977 to develop a plan to eliminate, overlap, and promote coordination among federal agencies with research and regulatory responsibility in the area of toxic substances. Its major product was a report issued in 1980 (Toxic Substances Strategy Committee, 1980).Google Scholar

4. The body of cancer research is continually changing and regulatory actions based on that research must be periodically reassessed. In addition, there were problems in the administration of environmental programs that needed to be addressed (seeCrandall, and Portney, , 1984). While recognizing both of these factors, the burden of the Reagan administration's environmental emphasis was on less regulation, with little management or policy reforms. The science was used to legitimize policy changes.Google Scholar

5. John Todhunter was the Assistant Administrator for Pesticides and Toxic Substances in EPA.Google Scholar

6. The implication is explicitly made by Weinstein (1983). He estimated that “the expected cost per year of life saved is expected to be $11,000 for a rodent bioassay of p-dichlorobenzene and $91 for a prospective trial for B-carotene” (Weinstein, , 1983, p. 20).Google Scholar