Hostname: page-component-7c8c6479df-r7xzm Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-03-29T01:46:53.053Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

STRATEGIC ALLIANCE FOR BLOCKCHAIN GOVERNANCE GAME

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 August 2020

Song-Kyoo (Amang) Kim*
Affiliation:
Computing Programme, School of Applied Sciences, Macao Polytechnic Institute, R. de Luis Gonzaga Gomes, Macao SAR E-mail: amang@ipm.edu.mo

Abstract

This paper deals with design of an alternative secure Blockchain network framework to prevent damages from an attacker. The alliance concept from the strategic management perspectives is applied on the top of a general stochastic game framework. This new enhanced hybrid theoretical model is designed to find the best strategies toward preparation for preventing a network malfunction from an attacker through strategic alliances with other genuine nodes and it is developed based on the combination of a strategic management framework and a conventional stochastic model based on the Blockchain Governance Game. Analytically, tractable results for decision-making parameters are fully obtained to predict of the moment for operations and also to provide the optimal number of allegiance nodes to protect a Blockchain network. This research helps those whom are considering initial coin offering or launching new Blockchain-based services by enhancing security features through strategic alliances in a decentralized network.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Antonopoulos, A.M. (2017). Mastering Bitcoin: programming the open blockchain, 2nd ed. Sebastopol, CA: O'Reilly.Google Scholar
Beikverdi, A. & Song, J. (2015). Trend of centralization in Bitcoin's distributed network. In Proceedings of the 16th IEEE/ACIS International Conference, IEEE. pp. 1–6.Google Scholar
Bhuiyan, B. (2018). An overview of game theory and some applications. Philosophy and Progress 59(1–2): 111128. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.3329/pp.v59i1-2.36683.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Decker, C. & Wattenhofer, R. (2013). Information propagation in the Bitcoin network. In IEEE P2P 2013 Proceedings, IEEE, pp. 1–10.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dshalalow, J.H. (1995). First excess level process. In Advances in queueing. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, pp. 244–261.Google Scholar
Dshalalow, J.H., & Ke, H.-J. (2009). Layers of noncooperative games. Nonlinear Analysis 71: 283291.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eyal, I. & Sirer, E. (2014 ). Majority is not enough: Bitcoin mining is vulnerable. Lecture Notes in Computer Science No. 8437. Berlin, Germany: Springer, pp. 436–454.Google Scholar
Garay, J., Kiayias, A., & Leonardos, N. (2015). The Bitcoin backbone protocol: analysis and applications. Lecture Notes in Computer Science No. 9057. Berlin, Germany: Springer, pp. 281310.Google Scholar
Johnson, G., Whittington, R., Regnér, P., Scholes, K., & Angwin, D. (2017). Exploring strategy text and cases, 11th ed. Harlow, UK: Pearson.Google Scholar
Kim, S.K. (2019). Blockchain governance game. Computers & Industrial Engineering 136: 373380.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Liu, Z., Luong, N.C., Wang, W., Niyato, D., Wang, P., Liang, Y.-C., & Kim, D.I. (2019). A survey on applications of game theory in blockchain. https://arxiv.org/abs/1902.10865. Accessed: 1 May 2019.Google Scholar
Nakamoto, S. (2009). Bitcoin: s peer-to-peer electronic cash system. http://www.bitcoin.org. Accessed: 1 May 2019.Google Scholar
Yli-Huumo, J., Ko, D., Choi, S., Park, S., & Smolander, K. (2016). Where is current research on blockchain technology? A systematic review. PLoS ONE 11(10): e0163477, 27 pages.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed