In the months following the July 7, 2005, attack that killed 52people and injured hundreds more, the British government was atpains to deny allegations that Britain was targeted by homegrown,al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorists because of its Middle East foreignpolicy. Yet the government was privately aware by May 2004 that a“particularly strong cause of disillusionment amongst Muslims … is aperceived ‘double standard’ in the foreign policy of westerngovernments (and often those of Muslim governments), in particularBritain and the U.S” (FCO/HO 2005).Specific causes cited were bias towards Israel vis-à-visPalestinians; non-action on Kashmir and Chechnya; and “activeoppression” in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the wider “war on terror.”Other alleged causes included social and economic deprivation,Islamophobia (particularly following 9/11), and intergenerationalclashes between first, second, and third generation Muslims. Butlittle attempt was made either before or after July 7, 2005, toexamine the interaction between these domestic and foreign sourcesof radicalization. This paper attempts to do so by examining therhetoric and actions of a range of young British Muslims including:examples of 48 persons convicted of, charged for, or killed byviolent jihad—evidence of young Muslim opinion on extremism andcauses of violent jihadi terror in Britain. The evidence from thispreliminary study, though not large enough to draw reliablestatistical inferences, does suggest that not only is Britishforeign policy a significant source of alienation among youngBritish Muslims, but that attitudes towards British foreign policyinteract with and often reinforce domestic social, cultural, andeconomic sources of discontent. As explained in the literaturereview below, examining the links between perceptions of foreignpolicy towards the wider Muslim Ummah and sources of domesticdiscontent offers a more satisfying account of British Muslimradicalization than those offered by the dominant structural (socialnetwork theories) and “aggrieved actor” interpretations.I would like to thank JonathanGithens-Mazer for organizing the PSA panel at the 2007 APSAAnnual Meeting where I presented this paper. I would also liketo thank Shah Miah for allowing me to cite evidence from his BAresearch project (Queen Mary, University of London); EmilyMclean Inglis and Anthony de Silva for research assistance; andZamila Bunglawala for advice and data on British Muslims and thelabor market.