Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 January 2008
If it is assessed against an objective of reducing the number ofMuslims recruited or inspired to commit terrorist acts in the nameof al-Qaeda, then the U.S.-led, UK-backed war on terror launched inthe aftermath of 9/11 has failed demonstrably. Thisperformance-related assessment, as William Tupman and CarinaO'Reilly argue, favors examining counterterrorism experience and theconsistency of government conduct during the war on terror (Tupmanand O'Reilly 2004). Such an approach,however, tends to expose the disregard the architects of the war onterror had for counterterrorism experience and policy-makers in theU.S. or UK have not adopted it in the six years since 9/11.Performance measurement may be routine in other areas ofgovernment-sponsored activity, but the war on terror has always beenpresented as a separate and exceptional activity dealing with anextraordinary enemy where familiar rules of engagement andconventional government behavior do not apply. However, in writingthis introduction on 9/11 in 2007, it is apparent that the failureof the response to the world's most dramatic terrorist attack hasfinally become clear to many who supported it for the major part ofits duration. Not that there is a consensus about the nature andextent of the failure. Nor is there a willingness to look to priorcounterterrorism experience that might have been used to promote ameasured, effective, and counterintuitive response to 9/11. Rather,notwithstanding moves to re-brand the war on terror in softer toneswith particular emphasis on counterinsurgency “hearts and minds”approaches (Kilcullen 2006), the sixthanniversary of 9/11 marks the culmination of a poorly targetedmilitary led response that has unintentionally boosted al-Qaedacredibility and recruitment.