Political scientists commonly use their courses to emphasize thepervasive nature of collective action problems, whereby groupinterests are undermined by individual incentives to “defect” or“free ride.” In a graduate seminar a faculty member may havestudents read classics in this area, such as Mancur Olson'sThe Logic of Collective Action (1965). Graduate students are often expectedto model a collective action problem as a prisoner's dilemma and beable to understand the implications in such areas as establishmentof interest groups, voting turnout, budgeting, and militaryrelationships among nations. Even in lower division undergraduatecourses political science instructors may integrate concepts fromcollective action theory. This orientation is also evident in sometextbooks. Thus in their introduction to American politics, SamuelKernell and Gary C. Jacobson (2003) offeran extensive discussion of collective action problems and the roleof government, and return repeatedly to this topic throughout theirbook. Similarly, a focus on collective action problems is at theheart of Walter Stone's introductory American politics text,Republic at Risk (1990).