1. Cf. Bowra, C. M., Pindar (Cambridge, UK 1964), 43f Google Scholar.: ‘The centre of Pindar’s religion is his vision of the gods as, first and foremost, embodiments of power’; U. von Wilamowitz (Glaube der Hellenen i.10): ‘… the divine is to kreitton compared with us … Being, active and endowed with will, was all–powerful in its action on the terrestrial plane, exalted above becoming and passing away: here was theos’ (quoted by Untersteiner, M., The Sophists [Oxford 1954], 105 Google Scholar). That the sense of dunamis extends beyond that of practical efficacy is clear from Nem. 6.1–4 itself, where the primary reference is to the stability (asphaleia) of divine as opposed to transience and vulnerability of mortal being. For dunamis in reference to ‘powers’ of mind, see Pyth. 5.117–19 and Ol. 9.80–83. On the opening lines of Nemean 6, see e.g. Gundert, H., Pindar und sein Dichterberuf (Frankfurt 1935), 20–26Google Scholar.

2. On this sense of elpis in Pyth. 2.49, see Fennell, C., Pindar: The Olympian and Pythian Odes (Cambridge, UK 1879), 165 Google Scholar; Bowra (n.l above), 44; Ruck, C. and Matheson, W., Pindar: Selected Odes (Ann Arbor 1968), 130 Google Scholar; with which contrast e.g. Lattimore, R., The Odes of Pindar (Chicago 1947), 50 Google Scholar. For more on the sense of elpis, see Myres, J., ‘ Elpis, Elpō, Elpomai, Elpizein ’, CR 63 (1949), 46 Google Scholar; Nisetich, F., ‘The Leaves of Triumph and Mortality: Transformation of a Traditional Image in Pindar’s Olympian 12’, TAPA 107(1977), 235–64Google Scholar; Dickson, K., Kairos and the Anatomy of Praxis in Pindar (Diss. SUNY at Buffalo 1982), 177–85Google Scholar.

3. For praxis as ‘actualization’ see Strohm, H., Tukhē: Zur Schicksalsauffassung bei Pindar und den frühgriechischen Dichtern (Stuttgart 1944), 17 Google Scholar, who defines it as ‘das künftige Vollenden, Durchsetzen—; see also Ol. 1.85; 8.29; 11.4; 13.106; Pyth. 9.68; Nem. 3.46; Isth. 6.11; etc.

4. See e.g. Coppola, G., Introduzione a Pindaro (Rome 1931), 204–16Google Scholar; Bieler, L., ’ Skias onar anthrōpos ’, in W. Calder and J. Stern (edd.), Pindaros und Bakchylides (Darmstadt 1970), 191–93Google Scholar.

5. See Young, D., Three Odes of Pindar: A Literary Study of Pythian 11, Pythian 3 and Olympian 7 (Leiden 1968 CrossRefGoogle Scholar), esp. 35–68 and Appendix 1; Dickson (n.2 above), 174–91.

6. See e.g. Ol. 3.15; 8.77–80; 10.91–96 (cf. 14.20–24); Pyth. 5.46–49; Nem. l.llf.; 4.6–8; Detienne, M., Les maitres de vérité dans la Grèce archaïque (Paris 1967), 9–29Google Scholar.

7. See e.g. Ol. 1.81–84; 5.16f; 8.67–69; Pyth. 8.85–87; cf. Segal, C., ‘God and Man in Pindar’s First and Third Olympian Odes’, HSCP 68 (1974), 211–67Google Scholar.

8. On the motif of theou kheir (‘hand of god’) in Pindar, see Ol. 10.3,20; 7.1; 9.26; Pyth. 1.48.

9. See Dickson (n.2 above), 38–47.

10. Strohm (n.3 above), 46–54.

11. On ‘blood heritage’ in Pindar, see e.g. Gundert (n.l above), 15–20: Rose, P., ‘The Myth of Pindar’s First Nemean: Sportsmen, Poetry and Paideia’, HSCP 78 (1974), 145–75Google Scholar; and cf. references given in n.54 below.

12. Espinas, A., Les origines de la technologie (Paris 1897), esp. 75–156Google Scholar; Vernant, J.–P., ‘Travail et nature dans la Grèce ancienne’, Journal de psychologie normale et pathologique (1955), 18–39Google Scholar, and ‘Remarques sur les formes et les limites de la pensée technique chez les Grecs’, RHS 10.3 (1957), 205–25Google Scholar. On ancient technology in general, see Schaerer, R., Episteēmē et Tekhriē: Étude sur les notions de conaissance et d’art d’Homère à Platon (Paris 1930 Google Scholar); Chapot, V., ‘Sentiment des anciens sur le mechanisme’, REA 40 (1938) 158–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Aymard, A., ‘Hiérarchie du travail et autarchie individuelle dans la Grèce archaïque’, Revue d’historie de la philosophie et d’histoire générale de la civilisation 11 (1943), 124–146Google Scholar, and ‘L’idée de travail dans la Grèce archaīque’, Journal de psychologie normale et pathologique (1948), 29–45Google Scholar; Schuhl, M. P., Machinisme et philosophie² (Paris 1947), esp. 1–22Google Scholar; Forbes, R., ‘The Ancients and the Machine’, Archiv international d’histoire des sciences 8 (July 1949), 919–33Google Scholar; Koyré, A., ‘Les philosophes et la machine’, and ‘Du monde de 1’ “à–peu–près” a l’univers de la precision’, in Études d’histoire de la pensée philosophique (Paris 1961), 279–309Google Scholar and 311–29; Heinimann, F., ‘Eine vorplatonische Theorie der tekhrie ’, MH 18 (1961) 105–30Google Scholar; McKeon, R., ‘Logos: Technology, Philology and History’, in Proceedings of the XVth International Congress of Philosophy (Sofia 1974), iii. 481–84Google Scholar; Uscatescu, G., ‘La pensée antique dans I’anthropologie et la technique actuelles’ Association G. Budé, ser. 4(1975), 479–84Google Scholar; Schadewaldt, W., ‘The Concepts of Nature and Technique According to the Greeks’, Research in Philosophy & Technology 2 (1979), 159–71Google Scholar.

13. See Heinimann, F., Nomos undPhysis (Basel 1965), 92–101Google Scholar; Gundert (n.l above), 15–19; Bowra (n.l above), 4–8.

14. The term is that of Espinas (n.12 above), 19.

15. The ode has not received the attention it deserves. See von Wilamowitz, U., Pindaros (Berlin 1922), 369–75Google Scholar; Jeanmaire, M., ‘La naissance d’Athéna et la royauté magique de Zeus’, REA 48 (1946), 12–20Google Scholar, esp. 25–27; Detienne, M. and Vernant, J.–P., Les ruses d’intelligence (Paris 1974), 176–200Google Scholar, 222f. On the mythological and cult background of Bellerophon and Pegasos, see Malten, L, ‘Bellerophontes’, JdAI 40 (1925), 121–60Google Scholar and ‘Homer und die lykischen Fürsten’, Hermes 79 (1944), 1–12Google Scholar; Schachermeyr, F., Poseidon und die Entstehung des griechischen Götterglaubens (Bern 1950), 174–88Google Scholar; and further references in Detienne/Vernant.

16. On invention in this sense see Kleingünther, A., Prōtos Heuretēs: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte einer Fragestellung (Leipzig 1933 Google Scholar), Thraede, K., ‘Das Lob der Erfinders: Bemerkungen zur Analyse der Heuremata–Kataloge’, RM 105 (1962), 158–86Google Scholar, esp. 160–66. On the poet as heurōsiepōs (Ol. 9.80), see Walsh, G., The Varieties of Enchantment (Chapel Hill 1984), 69 Google Scholar.

17. See Ol. 13.93–95; Pyth. 1.81–84; 4.247f; 8.29–32; 9.76–79; Nem. 4.33f., 69–72; 10.19f; Isth. 1.60–63; 6.56–59.

18. Most recently, on Pindar’s social responsibilities and the effects of poetry, see Walsh (n.16 above), 48–61, and references therein.

19. The quote is from Burton, R., Pindar’s Pythian Odes (Oxford 1962), 116f Google Scholar. See also Doyle, R., ‘ Olbos, Koros, Hubris and Atē from Hesiod to Aeschylus’, Traditio 26 (1970), 283–303Google Scholar, along with Gundert (n.l above), 67–70, and Walsh (n.16 above), 48–61. On koros and the affective life in Pindar, see Dickson (n.2 above), 174–77.

20. Slater, W., A Lexicon to Pindar (Berlin 1969), 301 CrossRefGoogle Scholar s.v. legō, cites this passage (along with Pyth. 2.22, Ol. 13.102, Pyth. 5.108, etc.) under the general heading ‘say’, ‘tell—; the context of Ol. 13.45f. surely argues instead in favour of its inclusion under the more original meaning ‘count’, ‘review’.

21. On the notion of metron in Pindar, see Otten, R., Metron, Mesos and Kairos: A Semasiological Study (Diss. Michigan 1956), 31–36Google Scholar; Prier, R., ‘Some Thoughts on the Archaic Use of Metron ’, CW 70 (1976 Google Scholar). See also Bergren, A., The Etymology and Usage of Peirar in Early Greek Poetry (Philadelphia 1975 Google Scholar).

22. On the meaning of metra here, see the scholiast (Drachmann, A., Scholia Vetera in Pindari Carmina I [Leipzig 1903], 362f.Google Scholar): ‘that is the limits [metra] placed on the horse by the bridle.’ See also the extensive study of the archaeological and cult background of the bridle by Yalouris, N., ‘Athena als Herrin der Pferde’, MH 7 (1950), 19–101Google Scholar. Prier (n.2 above), 161, takes metra here differently, as referring not to the concrete implement but rather to the ‘ability in mastering the dynamics of guiding horses’, and quotes C. Mommsen (Annotationis Criticae Supplementum ad Pindari Olympias [Berlin 1864], 162) by way of support: ‘[metron] actionem igitur et rationem potius quam rem significat.’ I see no reason why metra cannot intend both implement and also the skill appropriate to its use, as later argument will show, though its primary reference here is surely to the bridle and bit. Mommsen’s interpretation incidentally supports the conclusion that Detienne/Vernant (n.15 above), 195–99, reach concerning the nature of influence proper to Athene in the sphere of horsemanship: ‘… maîtrise dans la conduite du char, qu’il s’agisse de mener le char bien droit sans dévier de la route …’ (199).

23. Prier (n.21 above), 162f. with n.5: ‘Each instance (Il. 7.471; 23.267f., 741f.; Od. 9.209f.) refers not to a physical measure by which a substance is measured but to a measure apparently held within the substance itself.’

24. See Jeanmaire (n.15 above), 26f., and Detienne/Vernant (n.15 above), 177f., on Medea and Sisyphos as representatives (and somewhat ambiguous ones) of the mētis (‘wisdom’) to which Pindar refers in line 50 and of which Athene is the divine exponent.

25. Detienne/Vernant (n.15 above), 179–85, offer a summary of the associations between Gorgon and horse in Greek thought (on which see also Jeanmaire, M., Dionysos [Paris 1951], 281–85Google Scholar), which leads them to conclude (180) that ‘… par sa nervosité, par ses hennissements, par ses crises d’affolement, par l’écume de sa bouche, par la sueur de sa robe, le cheval apparait comme un animal mystérieux et inquiétant, il est une force démonique.’ Since their concern is neither with the nature of human action in Pindar nor even so much with the problem of tekhnē as with the structural ‘formes de complemēntarité et d’opposition’ (176) that obtain between Athene and Poseidon, Detienne/Vernant do not draw attention to the degree to which the language descriptive of Pegasos in Olympian 13 serves also to highlight the animal’s morphologically ambiguous and hence elusive character. This also leads them to overlook the transformative power of the bridle itself, despite the fact that they recognize (184f.) its magical properties.

26. On the passage, see West, M. (ed.), Hesiod Theogony (Oxford 1966), 247 Google Scholar. For the accepted etymology (from pēgos, ‘white’), see Schachermeyr (n.15 above), 179.

27. See Gundert (n.l above), 24–26, 69f.; Mette, H., ‘Die “Grosse Gefahr”‘, Hermes 80 (1952), 409–19Google Scholar; Segal (n.7 above), 212–15.

28. See Young (n.5 above), 35–37, 116–20; Ramnoux, C., ‘L’amour du lointain’. Revue de la Méditerranée 20 (1960), 439–49Google Scholar.

29. On similarities between the Pelops and Iamos episodes, see J. Kakridis, ‘Des Pelops und Iamos Gebet bei Pindar’, in Calder and Stern (n.4 above), 159–174.

30. The type represented here would ideally combine elements of the classic anxiety dream (cf. Il. 22. 199–201) and the dream of pursuit (cf. Aeschylus, Eum. 94–139) with the dream in which the desired object slips the grasp of the dreamer (cf. Aeschylus, Ag. 420–25). See in general Hundt, J., Der Traumglaube bei Homer (Greifswald 1935 Google Scholar); Devereux, G., Dreams in Ancient Greek Tragedy (Berkeley 1976), xxi–xxiiiGoogle Scholar with Chs. 3 and 4; Simon, B., Mind and Madness in Ancient Greece (Ithaca 1978), 57f.Google Scholar; Kessels, A., Studies on the Dream in Greek Literature (Utrecht 1978 Google Scholar).

31. See Jeanmaire (n.15 above), 26; Detienne/Vernant (n.15 above), 184–86.

32. On the problem of causality in magic, see e.g. Mauss, M., General Theory of Magic (rpr. London 1972 Google Scholar); Tambiah, J., ‘Magical Acts: A Point of View’, in R. Horton and R. Finnegan (ed.), Modes of Thought (London 1973), 199–229Google Scholar; Horton, R., ‘African Traditional Thought and Western Science’, Africa 37 (1968), 50–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 155–87; Jarvie, I and Agassi, J., ‘The Problem of the Rationality of Magic’, British Journal of Sociology 18 (1967), 55–74CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Grant, R., Miracle and Natural Law in Graeco–Roman and Early Christian Thought (Amsterdam 1952 Google Scholar), esp. 3–40; Lloyd, G., ‘Aspects of the Interrelations of Medicine, Magic and Philosophy in Ancient Greece’, Apeiron 9 (1975), 1–16Google ScholarPubMed; M., and Wax, R., ‘The Notion of Magic’, Current Anthropology 4.5 (December 1963), 495–518Google Scholar. On rhetoric and seduction, see de Romilly, J., Magic and Rhetoric in Ancient Greece (Cambridge, UK 1975 CrossRefGoogle Scholar); Marsh, T., Magic, Poetics, Seduction: An Analysis of Thelgein in Greek Literature (Diss. SUNY at Buffalo 1979 Google Scholar).

33. Cf. Espinas (n.12 above), 85f.: ‘Le propre du thauma est de produire quelque effet méchanique par des ressorts cachés; la cause du movement restant invisible, la machine a l’air de se mouvoir elle–même, ou du moins il y a quelque chose qui parait merveilleux dans son mouvement.’ See also Vernant, ‘Remarques …’ (n.12 above), 210–12.

34. See Ol. 9.33, Pyth. 4.178 and Dith. 4.37 for magical implements associated with gods (cf. Isth. 4.42f.). On the ‘machines’ of Hephaistos, see Delcourt, M., Héphaistos ou la légende du magicien (Paris 1982 Google Scholar), esp. 48–64. On the nature and function of magical implements in general, see the article ‘Zauberstab’ in W. Roscher, Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und romischen Mythologie (Leipzig and Berlin 1924–1937), vi. 542–59Google Scholar; Gernet, L., ‘La notion mythique de la valeur en Grèce’, Journal depsychologie normale et pathologique 41 (1948), 415–62Google Scholar; Marsh (n.33 above), Ch. 1.

35. On the cult of Athene Khalinitis, see Yalouris (n.22 above), esp. 19–30.

36. For the folktale motif of the magic bridle that can restrain all horses and that is even empowered to transform whatever it is put on (often a man, though sometimes other animals) into a horse, see the references in Thompson, S., Motif–Index of Folk–Literature (Bloomington 1955 Google Scholar), types D535 (cf. D722) and D1442.1. The view of the world as ultimately tractable to human desire that characterizes folktale in general makes technology central to the genre; for discussion and further references, see Peradotto, J., ‘Prophecy Degree Zero: Tiresias and the End of the Odyssey ’, Oralità [= Atti del Convegno Internazionale: Urbino, 21–25 July 1980] (Rome 1986), 429–34Google Scholar, with n.7.

37. On the metaphorical association of darkness with oblivion and anonymity, see Detienne (n.6 above), 9–29.

38. On metron as ‘mastery’ see Untersteiner (n.l above), 41–51. For modern philosophical studies of technology and in particular of the distinctions between modern technology and ancient technē see Heidegger, M., ‘Die Frage nach der Technik’, in Vorträdge und Aufsätze (Pfullingen 1954), 13–44Google Scholar (translated as ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, in D. Krell[ed.] Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings [NY 1977], 283–317Google Scholar), on which refer e.g. to Alderman, H., ‘Heidegger: Technology as Phenomenon’, The Personalist 51 (1970), 535–45Google Scholar (reprinted with revision as ‘Heidegger’s Critique of Science and Technology’ in M. Murray [ed.]. Heidegger and Modern Philosophy [New Haven 1978], 35–50Google Scholar); Goff, R., ‘Wittgenstein’s Tools and Heidegger’s Implements’, Man and World 1 (1968), 447–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Schaeffler, R., ‘M. Heidegger und die Frage nach der Technik’, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 9 (1955), 116–27Google Scholar. See also Moser, S., Metaphysik einst und jetzt. Kritische Untersuchungen zu Begriff und Ansatz der Ontologie (Berlin 1958 Google Scholar), esp. 231–94 (‘Zur Metaphysik der Technik’); and the essays in H. Lenk and S. Moser (edd.), Techne Technik Technologie (Pullach–bei–München 1973 Google Scholar). The standard bibliography is that of Mitcham, C., Bibliography of the Philosophy of Technology (Chicago 1973 Google Scholar).

39. Detienne/Vernant (n.15 above), 184f.; Marsh (n.32 above), 15–17, on pharmaka esthla and pharmaka lugra (cf. Od. 4.227–30); Bergren, A., ‘Helen’s “Good Drug”: Odyssey 4.1–305’, in S. Krésic (ed.), Contemporary Literary Hermeneutics and Interpretation of Classical Texts (Ottawa 1981), 201–14Google Scholar; Segal, C., Pindar’s Mythmaking: The Fourth Pythian Ode (Princeton 1986), 52f CrossRefGoogle Scholar. with nn. 1 and 2.

40. The most familiar cases are those of Kirke (Od. 10.229ff.), on which see Frazer, J. (ed. and tr.), Apollodorus: The Library (Cambridge, UK 1921), ii. 286fGoogle Scholar. with nn. 1 and 2, and the account of Medea’s ‘rejuvenation’ of Pelias (see art in Roscher [n.34 above] vol.4). On the folktale motif, see Thompson (n.36 above) type D550 (cf. D1030–40).

41. See especially Tambiah (n.32 above) and other references. On ancient medical magic in general, see e.g. Tavenner, E., Studies in Magic from Latin Literature (New York 1916), 61–123Google Scholar; Edelstein, L., ‘Greek Medicine in its Relation to Religion and Magic’, BHM5 (1937), 201–46Google Scholar; Ackerknecht, E., ‘Problems of Primitive Medicine’, BHM 11 (1942), 503–21Google Scholar: Ghalioungui, P., Magic and Medical Science in Ancient Egypt (London 1963 Google Scholar); Kudlien, F., ‘Early Greek Primitive Medicine’, Clio 3 (1968) 305–36Google Scholar; Lloyd, G., Polarity and Analogy (Cambridge, UK 1966), 177–81Google Scholar, and Magic Reason and Experience (Cambridge, UK 1979 Google Scholar), esp. 37–49.

42. On Athene’s association with tekhne in Pindar, see Ol. 7.32–53, Pyth. 10.45, Pyth. 12.6–24, Nem. 3.50f; Köhnken, A., Die Funktion des Mythos bei Pindar (Berlin 1971 CrossRefGoogle Scholar), who notes (176), ‘Die Göttin Athene … wird bei Pindar vor allem dann erwähnt, wenn “technisch” erstaunliche Taten zu vollbringen sind,’ with which cf. 126. On the complementarity of Athene and Poseidon, see Detienne/Vernant (n.15 above), esp. 190–200, 222–26; the latter section appears in English translation, with critical notes by the editor, as ‘The Sea Crow’ in R. Gordon (ed.), Myth, Religion and Society (Cambridge, UK 1981), 16–42Google Scholar.

43. Cf. the phrase hormou metron (Od. 13.101), which denotes both the boundary that separates open sea and harbour, and thus also the destination for sea travel. See the references above (note 21) for more on the pre–Pindaric sense of metron, and also Gow, A., ‘ Metra Thalassēs ’, CR 45 (1931), 10–12Google Scholar.

44. Otten (n.21 above), 3f. The summary that follows is indebted to his exposition.

45. See Bunn, J., The Dimensionality of Signs, Tools and Models (Bloomington 1981 Google Scholar), esp. 25–46, on the relation of tools to signs and models and on the semiotic ‘dimensions’ of each.

46. Otten (n.21 above), 3.

47. See Onians, R., The Origins of European Thought (Cambridge, UK 1951), 310–42Google Scholar; Bergren (n.21 above), 19–61; and the discussion oiperas and kosmos in Guthrie, W., A History of Greek Philosophy I (Cambridge, UK 1962), 205–12Google Scholar; G. Lloyd, Polarity … (n.41 above), 95f., 107f.

48. See Bergren (n.21 above) 41–43.

49. Cf. in particular the well–known Solon fr. 16 (West): gnōmosunēs d’aphanes khalepōtaton esti ndēsaii/metron, ho dē paniōn peirata mounon ekhei (‘it is very hard to know the obscure measure of good sense, yet it posseses the limits of all things’) with the comments of Otten (n.21 above), 14–27, esp. 14–16 and 26f.; Prier (n.21 above), 165–67; Bergren (n.21 above) 132–39. Prier (165) remarks: ‘Metron in Solon is, then, a noetic phenomenon structuring or regulating particular and universal phenomena.’ On the meaning of noein as intuitive apperception of the ‘essence’ of a thing or situation, see von Fritz, K., ‘ Noos and Noein in the Homeric Poems,’ CP 38 (1943), 73–93Google Scholar, and ‘ Nous, Noein and their Derivatives in Pre–Socratic Philosophy (Excluding Anaxagoras)’, CP 40 (1945), 223–42Google Scholar, and 41 (1946), 12–34. Most commentators follow A. Boeckh (Pindari Carmina [Leipzig 1811–21], i. 423) in taking kairos as the intended object of noēsai at Ol. 13.47, whereas the interpretation offered by Dissen, L. (Pindari Carmina [Gotha 1842], 163 Google Scholar; and cf. also Gildersleeve, B., Pindar: The Olympian and Pythian Odes [New York 1885], 232f.Google Scholar), which takes metron as object and kairos as predicative, seems preferable both in itself and also on the basis of the comparanda; see Otten (n.21 above), 41 n.ll.

50. Otten (n.21 above) 14–16, 19, 33.

51. Especially within the moral register, instances of deficiency with reference to metron are of course far rarer than those of excess. See Nem. 11.29–32, however, for an example of failure of courage that gives rise to failure to commit oneself to action. The unheroic alternatives of ‘sitting in darkness’ (Ol. 1.81–84) and ‘staying at home’ (Pyth. 4.185f.), along with the whole ethic of ‘expenditure’ (dapana), ‘effort’ (ponos) and risk — on which see e.g. Gundert (n.l above), 26f.; Szastynska–Siemion, A., ‘Le ponos sportif dans l’épinice grec’, Eirene (1971), 81–85Google Scholar, and ‘ Dapana und Ponos bei Pindar’, in W, Schmidt (ed.), Aiskhylos und Pindar: Studien zu Werk und Nachwirkung (Berlin 1981), 90–92Google Scholar — imply as their background the ever–present possibility of failure to ‘live up’ to one’s potential.

52. Otten (n.21 above), 33: ‘To pursue anything huper metron [“beyond measure”; cf. Pyth. 2.34] is to pursue it beyond that point at which it is fully and completely itself and beyond which it becomes something other than itself.’

53. See Onians (n.47 above), 314f., 383f.; Bergren (n.21 above), 41f.

54. See most recently Steiner, D., The Crown of Song: Metaphor in Pindar (London 1986), 28–39Google Scholar; Carne–Ross, D., ‘Weaving with Points of Gold: Pindar’s Sixth Olympian ’, Arion n.s.3 (1976), 5–44Google Scholar, esp. 42–44; McCracken, G., ‘Pindar’s Figurative use of Plants’, AJP 55 (1934), 340–45Google Scholar.

55. See also Ol. 7.35, with reference to the skills of Hephaistos; and Pyth. 4.249, where the magical techniques employed by Medeia are at issue. Other references to tekhnē in the odes intend the sense of ‘plan’ or ‘stratagem’ (Ol. 9.52; Pyth. 2.32; 3.11; Nem. 4.58). The passage at Isth. 4.33–37, where the context is that of ‘moves’ in wrestling, combines the notion of trickery with that of specific, physical skill.

56. See Verdenius, W., Pindar’s Seventh Olympian Ode: A Commentary (Amsterdam 1972), 22Google Scholar (on line 52), and references therein.

57. Schaerer (n.12 above) 4: ‘Ainsi un peuple entier et une fois pour toutes … se trouve gratifié d’une connaissance divine. II ne s’agit plus de l’individu de génie que les dieux choisissent pour lui communiquer l’inspiration, mais d’une collectivité qui, une fois en possession du divin présent, peut en quelque sort se passer de la déesse. Whether this justifies his conclusion that the gift ‘n’ est plus divine que par son origine; pour le reste il est entièrement humain’ is not self–evident.

58. See Kleingünther (n.16 above); Thraede (n.16 above); Cole, T., Democritus and the Sources of Greek Anthropology (Philadelphia 1967 Google Scholar).

59. See nn. 11 and 13 above for further references. The principal instance in which the teaching of skills bears no negative connotations is that of the centaur Kheiron, who serves as tutor to both Asklepios (Pyth. 3.45f.) and Jason (Pyth. 4.102; Nem. 3.53–55). Here, however, it is a matter of transaction between an immortal and heroes, and also involves ‘total’ and ‘lived’ education. Although it is praised, the teaching practised by such athletic trainers as Melesias (Ol. 8.59–64; Nem. 6.64–66), Orseas (Isth. 4.78–80) and Ilas (Ol. 10.16–21) is expressly regarded as ancillary, the refinement of talents themselves considered innate.

60. See Bunn (n.45 above), 23–25: ‘So let us define models as tools whose utility has been extended and so transformed that they are no longer means to a different end but are mirrors of the problematic end itself. For the increasing application of an effective tool to wider areas of endeavour renders it a model by reason of its near universality: the principle of the Egyptian astronomer’s gnomon gradually becomes transformed into the cosmic law [i.e. the “golden section”] of the Great Pyramid; the rope knotted lengthwise into ratios of 3–4–5, used as a measuring tool by Mesopotamian surveyors, becomes a Pythagorean model for the chord music of the spheres; a device such as a watch becomes a model for a mechanistic universe.’

61. See Köhnken, A., Die Funktion des Mythos bei Pindar (Berlin 1971), 117–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar, esp. 138–47, and ‘Perseus’ Kampf und Athenes Erfindung’, Hermes 104 (1976), 257–65Google Scholar, and references therein. Fennell (n.2 above), 276, suggests that oulion at line 8 in reference to the plaint of the Gorgons might mean ‘varied’ or ‘shifting’ rather than ‘dismal—; on this see Köhnken, 136.

62. See for discussion and further references Solmsen (n.12 above), esp. 487–92; Theiler, W., Zur Geschichte der teleologischen Naturbetrachtung bis auf Aristoteles (Zürich 1924 Google Scholar); Walzer, R., Magna Moralia und Aristotelische Ethik (Berlin 1929), 31ff.Google Scholar; Wild, J., ‘Plato’s Theory of Tekhnē: A Phenomenological Interpretation’, Ph.&Phen.R. 1 (1941), 255–93Google Scholar; Lloyd, Polarity … (n.41 above), 274–90.

63. Mitcham, C., ‘Philosophy and the History of Technology’, in G. Bugliarello (ed.). The History and Philosophy of Technology (Urbana 1979), 163–201 at 186Google Scholar.