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Belief, credence, and faith

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 July 2018

ELIZABETH JACKSON
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, 100 Malloy Hall, Notre Dame, IN 46556, USA
Corresponding
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Abstract

In this article, I argue that faith's going beyond the evidence need not compromise faith's epistemic rationality. First, I explain how some of the recent literature on belief and credence points to a distinction between what I call B-evidence and C-evidence. Then, I apply this distinction to rational faith. I argue that if faith is more sensitive to B-evidence than to C-evidence, faith can go beyond the evidence and still be epistemically rational.

Type
Articles from the 2018 Postgraduate Essay Prize
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018

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