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Contradictions are Ontological Arguments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

Yuval Steinitz
Affiliation:
University of Haifa, Mount Carmel, Haifa 31905, Israel

Abstract

Although ontological arguments had provoked many objections, most of them boil down to the claim that a purely conceptual analysis must be devoid of factual content. Thus, instead of rebutting each of these objections separately, this paper intends to convince those who deny ontological arguments to admit the existence, from their own perspectives, of at least negative ontological arguments. The paper argues that conceptual contradictions constitute arguments of this type, showing what necessarily does not exist.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1994

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