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Defending the independence constraint: a reply to Snider
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 May 2008
In an earlier paper I argued that Alvin Plantinga's defence of pure experiential theism (a theism epistemically based on religious experience) against the evidential problem of evil is inappropriately circular. Eric Snider rejects my argument claiming first that I do not get Plantinga's thought right. Second, he rejects a key principle my argument relies on, viz. the ‘independence constraint on neutralizers’. Finally, he offers an alternative to the independence constraint which allows the pure experiential theist to deal successfully with the evidential problem of evil. In this paper I argue that: (a) I have correctly characterized Plantinga's argument; and (b) that Snider's proposed counter-example to the independence constraint fails. Finally, I argue (c) that Snider's proposed alternative to the independence constraint is not a plausible epistemic principle.
- Religious Studies , Volume 44 , Issue 2 , June 2008 , pp. 203 - 207
- Copyright © 2008 Cambridge University Press
1 Silver, David ‘Religious experience and the evidential argument from evil’, Religious Studies, 38 (2002), 339–353CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
2 Snider, Eric ‘Are causes of belief reasons for belief? Silver on evil, religious experience, and theism’, Religious Studies, 44, 2008), 185–202.CrossRefGoogle Scholar References to this articles are in-text.