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Divine will/divine command moral theories and the problem of arbitrariness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 February 2012

THOMAS L. CARSON*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Loyola University Chicago, Chicago, Illinois 60626, USA e-mail: tcarson@luc.edu

Abstract

A well-known objection to divine will/divine command moral theories is that they commit us to the view that God's will is arbitrary. I argue that several versions of divine will/divine command moral theories, including two of Robert Adams's versions of the DCT and my own divine preference theory, can be successfully defended against this objection. I argue that, even if God's preferences are somewhat arbitrary, we have reasons to conform our wills to them. It is not a fatal objection to divine will/divine command moral theories if they imply that God's will/God's commands is/are arbitrary, to some extent.

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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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References

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