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From modal collapse to moral collapse

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 May 2024

Drew Smith Open the ORCID record for Drew Smith [Opens in a new window]
Drew Smith*
Affiliation:
Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, Fort Worth, TX, USA
*
Email: william.andrew.smith@me.com
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Abstract

I aim in this article to contribute two points to the ongoing discussion regarding strong DDS and modal collapse. First, I will examine a recent version of the modal collapse objection formulated by R. T. Mullins, demonstrating that one can modify the argument to survive its most forceful rejoinder. Having established the cogency of Mullins's modal collapse argument, I next aim to heighten the severity of the conclusion. In particular, I demonstrate that the success of the modal collapse argument entails a moral collapse wherein well-established principles of ethical reasoning fail. Finally, I examine a recent attempt by Katherine Rogers to undercut some of the unwelcomed results of a modal collapse via an appeal to the theistic multiverse. I conclude that this manoeuvre proves ineffective against the moral collapse objection.

Keywords

modal collapsemoral collapsedivine simplicity

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Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 61 , Special Issue 2: Featuring articles on Engaging Philosophically with Afro-Brazilian Religions , June 2025 , pp. 395 - 409
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press

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