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God, fatalism, and temporal ontology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 July 2009

DAVID KYLE JOHNSON*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, King's College, Wilkes-Barre, PA18711

Abstract

Theological incompatibility arguments suggest God's comprehensive foreknowledge is incompatible with human free will. Logical incompatibility arguments suggest a complete set of truths about the future is logically incompatible with human free will. Of the two, most think theological incompatibility is the more severe problem; but hardly anyone thinks either kind of argument presents a real threat to free will. I will argue, however, that sound theological and logical incompatibility arguments exist and that, in fact, logical incompatibly is the more severe problem. A deep analysis of the arguments will reveal that, to avoid a fatalist conclusion, we must reject bivalence and adopt a specific kind of temporal ontology (presentism), which also forces the theist to embrace open theism.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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