^{page 75 note 1} Basinger, David, ‘Middle Knowledge and Classical Christian Thought’, Religious Studies, XXII, Nos. 3–4 (Sept.–Dec., 1986). 407–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar All subsequent references to this article will be by page numbers in parentheses in the text.

^{page 75 note 2} An issue we do not raise in the paper is what is required for certain knowledge. Suppose, e.g. that one believes something on the basis of extremely strong evidence and one's belief is in fact true. The truth of this belief is, however, not logically necessary. Do these circumstances suffice for knowledge with certainty? In this paper, we assume, with Basinger, that God does not possess certain knowledge of a state of affairs unless he perceives it directly or deduces it from the existence of other states of affairs he knows with certainty.

^{page 79 note 1} We do not here assume the truth of this interpretation of quantum mechanics.

^{page 86 note 1} One might claim that it can be known that someone's character would make him more likely to choose one alternative than others or, with Suarez, that the chooser has a property (habitudo) for freely choosing one alternative. But either the character or property brings it about (i.e. causes or entails) that given the circumstances, the person will choose the alternative, which negates the hypothesis of freedom. Or it does not: and then God cannot by knowing the person's character or his potentiality for choice know the choice. The choice that would be made, if the possible circumstances of choice were actual, designates nothing, unless only one choice is possible. The question, what would happen if the possible circumstances were actual, is redundant and contributes nothing to our problem.