1. See John Hick (ed.) Classical and Contemporary Readings in the Philosophy of Religion, 2nd edn (Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970), 515.
2. See e.g. Wykstra Stephen ‘The Humean obstacle to evidential arguments from suffering: on avoiding the evils of “appearance”’, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 (1984), 73–93, in which Wykstra writes ‘[I]f we think carefully about the sort of being theism proposes for our belief, it is entirely expectable – given what we know of our cognitive limits – that the goods by virtue of which this Being allows known suffering should very often be beyond our ken.’
3. I allow that considerations pertinent to reasonableness may include the fact that a belief is, in the terminology of reformed epistemology, ‘properly basic’.
4. Edward Madden and Peter Hare Evil and the Concept of God (Springfield IL: C. Thomas, 1968).
6. Cahn Stephen ‘Cacodaemony’, Analysis, 37 (1976), 69–73.
8. Stein Edward ‘God, the demon, and the status of theodicies’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 27 (1990), 163–167.
10. New Christopher ‘Antitheism’, Ratio, 6 (1993), 36–43.
11. Daniels Charles ‘God, demon, good, evil’, Journal of Value Inquiry, 31 (1997), 177–181.
13. With the exception, of course, of a few scientific thought-experiments – such as Galileo's experiment involving chained falling balls, designed to show that two balls of different weights must fall at the same speed.
14. Between acceptance and publication of this paper I discovered an excellent early discussion of the evil-god hypothesis: Millican Peter ‘The devil's advocate’, Cogito, 3 (1989), 193–207. Millican makes much the same move as I make here, and also offers a similar treatment of the first moral argument below.
15. Mawson T. J. Belief in God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), ch. 12.
17. See New ‘Antitheism’, 37.
18. Daniels ‘God, demon, good, evil’.