Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home

Intrinsic value and love: three challenges for God's Own Ethics

  • ERIK J. WIELENBERG (a1)

Abstract

I advance three challenges for the view Murphy advances in God's Own Ethics. The first two challenges target Murphy's claim that God does not have requiring reasons to prevent the suffering of rational creatures. I develop two arguments against that position, one based on the intrinsic value of human beings, the other based on the intrinsic badness of the suffering of rational creatures. My third challenge targets Murphy's account of God's contingent love for humanity. I seek to raise doubts about whether Murphy's picture is one in which it is true to say that God loves all human beings.

Copyright

Corresponding author

References

Hide All
Davison, Scott A. (2012) On the Intrinsic Value of Everything (New York: Continuum).
Moore, George Edward (1903) Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Murphy, Mark C. (2017) God's Own Ethics: Norms of Divine Agency and the Argument from Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Intrinsic value and love: three challenges for God's Own Ethics

  • ERIK J. WIELENBERG (a1)

Metrics

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between <date>. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed