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Miracles: metaphysics, physics, and physicalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 May 2008

KIRK MCDERMID
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy and Religion, Montclair State University, Montclair, NJ 07403

Abstract

Debates about the metaphysical compatibility between miracles and natural laws often appear to prejudge the issue by either adopting or rejecting a strong physicalist thesis (the idea that the physical is all that exists). The operative component of physicalism is a causal closure principle: that every caused event is a physically caused event. If physicalism and this strong causal closure principle are accepted, then supernatural interventions are ruled out tout court, while rejecting physicalism gives miracles metaphysical carte blanche. This paper argues for a more moderate version of physicalism that respects important physicalist intuitions about causal closure while allowing for miracles' logical possibility. A recent proposal for a specific mechanism for the production of miracles (Larmer (1996d)) is criticized and rejected. In its place, two separate mechanisms (suitable for deterministic and indeterministic worlds, respectively) are proposed that do conform to a more moderate physicalism, and their potential and limitations are explored.

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Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 Cambridge University Press

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