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On grounding God's knowledge of the probable


A common objection to the Molinist account of divine providence states that counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs) lack grounds. Some Molinists appeal to brute counterfactual facts about the subject of the CCF in order to ground CCFs. Others argue that CCFs are grounded by the subject's actions in nearby worlds. In this article, I argue that Open Theism's account of divine providence employs would-probably conditionals that are most plausibly grounded by either brute facts about the subject of these conditionals or non-actual entities. As a result, Open Theism's revision of the traditional notion of divine providence is unmotivated. The Molinist can ground CCFs just as easily as the Openist can ground would-probably conditionals but the Molinist has the advantage of maintaining a robust account of divine providence.

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Alvin Plantinga (1985) ‘Replies to my colleagues’, in James E. Tomberlin & Peter van Inwagen (eds) Alvin Plantinga (Dordrecht: Reidel), 313396.

Michael Robinson (2000) ‘Why divine foreknowledge?’, Religious Studies, 36, 251275.

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Religious Studies
  • ISSN: 0034-4125
  • EISSN: 1469-901X
  • URL: /core/journals/religious-studies
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