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Problems for moral/natural supervenience

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 April 2010

DAVID E. ALEXANDER
DAVID E. ALEXANDER
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Huntington University, 2303 College Avenue Huntington, IN 46750 e-mail: dalexander@huntington.edu
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Abstract

‘Everyone agrees that the moral features of things supervene on their natural features’ (Smith (1994), 22). Everyone is wrong, or so I will argue. In the first section, I explain the version of moral supervenience that Smith and others argue everyone should accept. In the second section, I argue that the mere conceptual possibility of a divine command theory of morality (DCT) is sufficient to refute the version of moral supervenience under consideration. Lastly, I consider and respond to two objections, showing, among other things, that while DCT is sufficient to refute this version of moral supervenience it is not necessary.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 47 , Issue 1 , March 2011 , pp. 73 - 84
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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