Skip to main content
×
Home
    • Aa
    • Aa

Replying to the anti-God challenge: a God without moral character acts well

  • PETER FORREST (a1)
Abstract
Abstract

Several authors, including Stephen Law in this journal, have argued that the case for an evil God is (about) as strong as for a good God. In this article I take up the challenge on behalf of theists who, like Richard Swinburne, argue for an agent of unrestricted power and knowledge as the ultimate explanation of all contingent truths. I shall argue that an evil God is much less probable than a good one. I do so by (1) distinguishing the analogical predication of ‘good’ or ‘evil’ of God from the literal predication, (2) interpreting ‘acting in a morally good way’ to mean ‘acting like a good consequentialist’, and (3) relying on an axiarchist thesis about agency that is congenial to theists and perhaps even presupposed by theism.

Copyright
Corresponding author
e-mail: pforrest@une.edu.au
References
Hide All
Peter Forrest (2007) Developmental Theism: From Pure Will to Unbounded Love (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

Timothy O'Connor (2008) Theism and Ultimate Explanation: The Necessary Shape of Contingency (Oxford: Blackwell).

Richard Swinburne (1994) The Christian God (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

Religious Studies
  • ISSN: 0034-4125
  • EISSN: 1469-901X
  • URL: /core/journals/religious-studies
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *
×

Metrics

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 5
Total number of PDF views: 28 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 193 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between September 2016 - 19th October 2017. This data will be updated every 24 hours.