¹ Talbott, Thomas, ‘The Doctrine of Everlasting Punishment’, Faith and Philosophy, VII (1990), 19–42;CrossRefGoogle Scholaridem‘Providence, Freedom, and Human Destiny’, Religious Studies, XXVI (1990), 227–45.Google Scholar

² Talbott, , ‘Everlasting Punishment’, 19–20.Google Scholar

³ It is not open to Talbòtt to respond here as he does to Swinburne's citation of Matt. 25.45 that the word for punishment (κoλασις) always refers in Greek secular literature to remedial punishment and that one may not derive doctrine from the incidentals of a parable. For Paul is teaching doctrine, and his words for vengeance and punishment are 6iK11atç and 6íxr1, which carry the sense of divine retribution and revenge. Moreover, Talbott's claim about the meaning of K6Xaatç is false and in any case somewhat irrelevant, since Kó7aatç is used in Judaeo-Christian literature for punishment which is non-remedial, e.g. IV Macc. 8.g concerning severe punishments preceding execution, II CI. 6.7 concerning eternal punishment from which there is no salvation, Dg. 9.2 concerning punishment and death as the reward of the unrighteous (Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, ed. Kittel, Gerhard, s.v. ‘κoλα´ζω, κóλασις’ by Johannes Schneider).Google Scholar One need not be a Greek scholar to recognize that the ‘eternal punishment’ (κóλασις αìω´νιoς) spoken of by Jesus cannot be remedial, since taking eternity to be purged of one's sin does not differ from never being purged of it! As for Talbott's hermeneutical point, the contrast between eternal punishment and eternal life features prominently in the parable and fits the context of divine judgement in the whole discourse, echoes Old Testament teaching (Dan. 12.2), and is straightforwardly affirmed by Jesus elsewhere (John 5.28–29; Mk. 9.48).

⁴ See brief discussion and references in Wenham, John, The Enigma of Evil: Can We Believe in the Goodness of God? (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1985).Google Scholar

⁵ Craig, William Lane, ‘“No Other Name”: A Middle Knowledge Perspective on the Exclusivity of Salvation through Christ’, Faith and Philosophy, VI (1989), 172–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶ Talbott, , ‘Everlasting Punishment’, 36–7.Google Scholar

⁷ Craig, , ‘“No Other Name”’, 172–88.Google Scholar

⁸ Talbott, , ‘Human Destiny’, 236.Google Scholar

⁹ A point made effectively by Lacy, Larry, ‘John Hick on Universal Salvation’, paper presented at the Eastern Division meeting of the Society of Christian Philosophers, University of Dayton, 7–9 04 1988.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Talbott, , ‘Everlasting Punishment’, 37;Google Scholar cf. idem, ‘Human Destiny’, 228:Google Scholar ‘If God is the ultimate source of human happiness and separation from God can bring only greater and greater misery into one's life, as Christians have traditionally believed, then why should anyone want to reject God?’

¹¹ Craig, , ‘“No Other Name”’, 184.Google Scholar Talbott cannot mean by ‘God's best efforts’ what He can properly do in the actual world, for we have already seen that what God can properly do to win some sinner's repentance may be far less than the sort of optimal circumstances which Talbott envisions. What Talbott is speaking of is a choice to reject God's grace irrevocably under the most conducive of circumstances for repentance. The question is whether there is what Molinists call ‘congruent grace’ for every free creature God could possibly create.

¹² Talbott, , ‘Human Destiny’, 237.Google Scholar

¹³ Milton, John, Paradise Lost, ed. with an Introduction by Frye, Northrop (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962), Bk. I, 105–11, 249–63, pp. 8, 12.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Henley, William Ernest, ‘Invictus’, in Modern Verse, rev. ed., ed. Williams, Oscar (New York: Pocket Books, 1958), p. III.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Poe, Edgar Allan, ‘The Black Cat’, in Complete Stories and Poems of Edgar Allan Poe (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966), p. 65.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Talbott, , ‘Human Destiny’, 244.Google Scholar Cf. idem, ‘Everlasting Punishment’, 39.Google Scholar ‘The more one freely rebels against God, the more miserable and tormented one becomes; and the more miserable and tormented one becomes, the more incentive one has to repent of one's sin and to give up one's rebellious attitudes. But more than that, the consequences of sin are themselves a means of revelation; they reveal the true meaning of separation and enable us to see through the very self-deception that makes evil choices possible in the first place. We may think we can promote our own interest at the expense of others and that our selfish attitudes are compatible with enduring happiness, but we cannot act upon such an illusion, at least not for long period of time, without shattering it to pieces. So in a sense, all roads have the same destination, the end of reconciliation, but some are longer and windier than others.’ The view expressed here is clearly Pelagian and obviates the need for any gracious action of God at all in drawing sinners to Himself. It grossly underestimates the lostness and hopelessness of sinners apart from God.

¹⁷ Talbott, , ‘Human Destiny’, 235.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Ibid. p. 238.

¹⁹ Ibid. p. 237.

²⁰ Ibid. p. 238; cf. idem, ‘Everlasting Punishment’, 38–9.Google Scholar

²¹ Talbott, , ‘Human Destiny’, 239.Google Scholar

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid. p. 240.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid. p. 241; cf. p. 245.

²⁶ Ibid. pp. 237–8.

²⁷ Plantinga, Alvin, ‘Self-Profile’, in Alvin Plantinga, ed. Tomberlin, James and Inwagen, Peter Van, Profiles 5 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985), p. 36.Google Scholar

²⁸ I am indebted to Thomas Talbott for his remarks on the first draft of this article.