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Time, foreknowledge, and alternative possibilities


In this article we respond to arguments from William Hasker and David Kyle Johnson that free will is incompatible with both divine foreknowledge and eternalism (what we refer to as isotemporalism). In particular, we sketch an Anselmian account of time and freedom, briefly defend the view against Hasker's critique, and then respond in more depth to Johnson's claim that Anselmian freedom is incompatible with free will because it entails that our actions are ‘ontologically necessary’. In defending Anselmian freedom we argue that our ordinary intuitions do not support Johnson's case and that Anselmian freedom is compatible with deliberation.

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D. Lewis (1996) ‘Elusive knowledge’, The Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74, 549567. Reprinted in D. Lewis, Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

T. Merricks (2009) ‘Truth and freedom’, Philosophical Review, 118, 2957.

K. Rogers (1996) ‘Omniscience, eternity, and freedom’, International Philosophical Quarterly, 36, 399412.

K. Rogers (2008) Anselm on Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

K. Rogers (2009) ‘Back to eternalism: a response to Leftow's “Anselmian presentism”’, Faith and Philosophy, 26, 320338.

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Religious Studies
  • ISSN: 0034-4125
  • EISSN: 1469-901X
  • URL: /core/journals/religious-studies
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