^{page 217 note 2} Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970. I think it adequate for our purposes to concentrate chiefly on this book.

^{page 218 note 1} Op. cit. p. 89.

^{page 218 note 2} Ibid.

^{page 218 note 3} Op. cit. p. 90. Again, entertaining religious beliefs ‘has to do with living by them, drawing sustenance from them, judging oneself in terms of them, being afraid of them, etc.’; from Death and Immortality (Macmillan, 1970), p. 68.Google Scholar

^{page 218 note 4} Faith and Philosophical Enquiry, p. 158.

^{page 218 note 5} Ibid.

^{page 219 note 1} I am not considering here those religious beliefs that are purely empirical in character, and are expressed in truth-claims such as, ‘This object is a relic of St Francis Xavier’, or ‘The tomb of St Philomena lies in such-and-such a place’. There is no dispute about the claim to fact-assertiveness of such statements.

^{page 219 note 2} Cf. John Hick±s analysis of ‘verification’ in ‘Theology and Verification’, Theology Today, xvii, 1 (April 1960), 12–17.Google Scholar

^{page 219 note 3} Op. cit. p. 4.

^{page 219 note 4} Op. cit. p. 89.

^{page 220 note 1} ’Theology and Verification’, p. 17.

^{page 220 note 2} God and the Universe of Faiths, p. 24.

^{page 220 note 3} Op. cit. p. 28.

^{page 220 note 4} Op. cit. p. 28.

^{page 220 note 5} Op. cit. pp. 17–18.

^{page 220 note 6} Op. cit. p. 60.

^{page 221 note 1} God and the Universe of Faiths, p. 4.

^{page 221 note 2} See, for instance, ‘Theology and Verification’, pp. 18–19.

^{page 221 note 3} Ibid. p. 19.

^{page 222 note 1} Op. cit. p. 4.

^{page 222 note 2} Op. cit. p. 30.

^{page 222 note 3} In Super De Divinis Nominibus Expositio, Mandonnet, ed., vol 2, p. 259.Google Scholar

^{page 222 note 4} Ibid.

^{page 222 note 5} Dynamics of Faith (London, 1957), p. 45.Google Scholar

^{page 224 note 1} Op. cit. p. 57.

^{page 224 note 2} Op. cit. p. 98.

^{page 224 note 3} Op. cit. p. 99.

^{page 225 note 1} Op. cit. p. 101; italicized in the original.

^{page 225 note 2} They need not be devotionally or theologically trivial.

^{page 225 note 3} Op. cit. pp. 101–4, 128 for example; also The Concept of Prayer (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), ch. 6.Google Scholar

^{page 225 note 4} Faith and Philosophical Enquiry, p. 73.

^{page 225 note 5} Op. cit. p. 68.

^{page 226 note 1} Op. cit. p. 7. In The Concept of Prayer he says: ‘Philosophy…leaves everything as it is, and tries to give an account of it’ (p. 3).

^{page 226 note 2} In ‘Dialogue and Encounter’, The Downside Review (January 1975.

^{page 227 note 1} Reform (October 1974), p. 19.Google Scholar

^{page 227 note 2} Ibid.

^{page 230 note 1} Op. cit. pp. 126–39.

^{page 230 note 2} Op. cit. p. 128.