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Why might God create?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 May 2022

T. J. Mawson Open the ORCID record for T. J. Mawson [Opens in a new window]
T. J. Mawson*
Affiliation:
St Peter's College, Oxford, OX1 2DL, UK
*
E-mail: tim.mawson@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
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Abstract

Some have held that this question cannot be given a satisfactory answer within the constraints imposed by a traditional theistic framework, a framework which sees the universe as contingent on God's free choice to create it. However, I shall argue that, while traditional theism certainly does place constraints on possible answers to the title question, on assumptions which are themselves plausible, these constraints leave open various possibilities for understanding the reasons God may have had as He decided whether or not to create something other than Himself.

Keywords

God; creation; reasons; axiology

Information

Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 59 , Special Issue 2: Special issue featuring: Shifting perspectives in African philosophy of religion , June 2023 , pp. 223 - 238
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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