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To date, studies of international politics have little space for time. In this article, I argue that time is constitutive of the international system by offering a genealogical historical sketch of the coeval rise of territorial state sovereignty and Western standard time (consisting of seconds, minutes, and hours). Sovereignty is rightly a foundational concept of both the international system and the field of International Relations (IR), but the emergence of the contemporary method of reckoning time during the Enlightenment also supported the project of political modernity, and is thus critical to IR. The genealogical motive of the sketch is to understand what have become naturalised, global social conventions as historically contingent, cosmopolitical phenomena that resulted from significant socio-political efforts and conflicts. I locate ‘sites’ where modern sovereignty emerged and explicate contemporaneous processes, factors, and events implicated in the rise of modern time at those sites. In doing so, I outline how particular modes of understanding space and time were bred in Western Europe, spread around the world via colonialism, and embedded during the eras of global war and post-colonialism. I conclude by contrasting current challenges to territorial state sovereignty with Western standard time's untrammelled global hegemony.
1 Nietzsche Friedrich W., The Genealogy of Morals, trans. Horace B. Samuel (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2003 ), p. 1 .
2 See Boorstin Daniel J., The Discoverers (New York: Random House, 1983) ; Giddens Anthony, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990) ; Kern Stephen, The Culture of Time and Space: 1880–1918 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983) ; Rifkin Jeremy, Time Wars: The Primary Conflict in Human History (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989) ; Toulmin Stephen and Goodfield June, The Discovery of Time (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977) .
3 Landes David S., Revolution in Time: Clocks and the Making of the Modern World (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 6 .
4 At minimum, coeval connotes basic contemporaneity, although I argue below that with regard to the phenomena in question, it also implies intersubjectivity, see Fabian Johannes, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), pp. 30–31 .
5 Territorial studies are legion and longstanding in IR. For examples, see, Herz John H., ‘Rise and Demise of The Territorial State’, World Politics, 9 (1957), pp. 473–493 ; Waltz Kenneth N., Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979) ; Ferguson Yale H. and Mansbach Richard W., Remapping Global Politics: History's Revenge and Future Shock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) . By contrast, IR's interest in temporality is much more recent and embryonic, see Hanson Stephen E., Time and Revolution: Marxism and the Design of Soviet Institutions (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997) ; Callahan William A., ‘War, Shame, and Time: Pastoral Governance and National Identity in England and America’, International Studies Quarterly, 50 (2006), pp. 395–419 ; Hutchings Kimberly, ‘Happy Anniversary! Time and Critique in International Relations Theory’, Review of International Studies, 33 (2007), pp. 71–89 ; Hutchings Kimberly, Time and World Politics: Thinking the Present (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008) ; Hom Andrew R. and Steele Brent J., ‘Open Horizons: The Temporal Visions of Reflexive Realism’, International Studies Review, 12 (2010), pp. 271–300 . Aside from these works, the attention paid to time by IR has been focused primarily on the social acceleration of time, a topic treated in the conclusion.
6 A genealogical inclination is also appropriate in terms of post-modernist efforts, based on understanding insecurity as temporal contingency, to challenge the promise that security and stability can be accomplished through knowledge production, see Derian James der, Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War (London: Basil Blackwell, 1992), pp. 35–38 .
7 Risking irony, for ‘foundational’ examples, see Foucault Michel, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, in Rabinow Paul and Rose Nikolas (eds), The Essential Foucault (New York: The New Press, 1994), pp. 351–369 ; Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals.
8 Goede Marieke de, Virtue, Fortune, and Faith: A Genealogy of Finance (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), p. 3 .
10 der Derian, Antidiplomacy.
11 Bartelson Jens, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) .
12 Many treatments of sovereignty in IR acknowledge its social foundations, see Biersteker Thomas J. and Weber Cynthia (eds), State Sovereignty as Social Construct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) ; Ruggie John Gerard, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization (London: Routledge, 1998) ; Hall Rodney Bruce, National Collective Identity: Social Constructs and International Systems (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999) ; Philpott Daniel, Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) . Regarding clock time, Giddens Anthony, The Constitution of Society (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 132–133 , suggests that it ‘should not be accepted simply as an unquestioned dimension […] but must be regarded as itself a socially conditioned influence upon […] actors in modern societies’.
13 Hutchings, ‘Happy Anniversary!’, p. 72; Hutchings, Time in World Politics. Brent Steele and I have recently conducted a temporalised overview of the discipline, including a further engagement with some of Hutchings’ arguments, see Hom and Steele, ‘Open Horizons’, pp. 275–6, 285–86. Hutchings understands progressive temporality as a particular relationship between clock and calendar time. The current discussion must, for practical reasons, bracket calendrical time, with the acknowledgement that calendars have historically undergone extensive rationalisation and standardisation efforts, see Adam Barbara, Time (Cambridge: Polity, 2004) ; Zerubavel Eviatar, ‘The French Republican Calendar: A Case Study in the Sociology of Time’, American Sociological Review, 42 (1977), pp. 868–877 ; Zerubavel Eviatar, ‘The Standardization of Time: A Sociohistorical Perspective’, The American Journal of Sociology, 88 (1982), pp. 1–23 ; Zerubavel Eviatar, The Seven Day Circle: The History and Meaning of the Week (New York: The Free Press, 1985) ; Zerubavel Eviatar, ‘Calendars and History: A Comparative Study of the Social Organization of National Memory’, in Olick Jeffrey K. (ed.), States of Memory: Continuities, Conflicts, and Transformations in National Retrospection (Durham, NC: Duke University Press: 2003), pp. 315–337 . It is likely that the rise of territorial sovereign states produced and was produced in part by increased interests and capabilities in controlling all of the manners of time reckoning of their populaces.
14 In addition to the works treated in this article, see Falk Richard A., Human Rights and State Sovereignty (Teaneck, NJ: Holmes & Meier, 1981) ; Kratochwil Friedrich, ‘Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the State System’, World Politics, 39 (1986), pp. 27–52 ; Jackson Robert H., Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) ; Onuf Nicholas G., ‘Sovereignty: Outline of a Conceptual History’, Alternatives, 16 (1991), pp. 425–446 ; Ruggie John Gerard, ‘Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations’, International Organization, 47 (1993), pp. 139–174 ; Walker R. B. J., Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) ; Krasner Stephen D., Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999) ; Krasner Stephen D., Problematic Sovereignty (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001) .
15 Philpott , Revolutions in Sovereignty, pp. 75–96 .
16 Teschke Benno, The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations (London: Verso, 2003) .
17 For a discussion of what modernity and the modern age should include, see Toulmin Stephen, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 7–13 . In order to preserve momentum toward a broad spatio-temporal image of IR, I do not currently distinguish between modernity and post-modernity.
18 Philpott , Revolutions in Sovereignty, p. 16, fn. 7 . Landes Although, Revolution in Time, p. 48 , remarks, ‘Not until the fourteenth century do we get our first unmistakable reports of mechanical clocks’, he also discusses ‘legend and speculation’ about the rise of mechanical timekeeping dating back to the turn of the millennium. The liberal historical window used here is open to criticism, but my investigation is premised on the belief that, no matter how rigorously the window of modernity is construed, the processes visible through that window have been a long time coming.
19 Spruyt Hendrik, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 3 .
20 Murphy Alexander B., ‘The Sovereign State System as Political-Territorial Ideal: Historical and Contemporary Considerations’, in Biersteker Thomas J. and Weber Cynthia (eds), State Sovereignty as Social Construct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 81 , emphasis added.
21 Philpott , Revolutions in Sovereignty, p. 16 .
22 Teschke , The Myth of 1648, pp. 2–3 .
23 Strang David, ‘Contested Sovereignty: The Social Construction of Colonial Imperialism’, in Biersteker Thomas J. and Weber Cynthia (eds), State Sovereignty as Social Construct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 22–23 . Toulmin , Cosmopolis, p. 7 , understands modern sovereignty as constituting ‘separate, independent […] states, each of them organised around a particular nation’, a framework problematised by the distinctions between dynastic, territorial, and national forms of sovereignty within the same general period, see Hall, National Collective Identity.
24 Rossum Gerhard Dohrn-van, History of the Hour: Clocks and Modern Temporal Orders (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 282 ; Landes , Revolution in Time, p. 8 , counts the common mechanism of modern time reckoning as some ‘oscillatory device [that] tracks the passing moments; it is what the Germans call a Zeitnormal, or time standard […] It beats time’.
25 Walker R. B. J., ‘State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 20 (1991), p. 458 .
26 Adam , Time, pp. 112–113 .
27 Walker, ‘State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time’, p. 458.
28 Edkins Jenny, Poststructuralism and International Relations: Bringing the Political Back in (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), p. 2 .
29 Toulmin , Cosmopolis, p. 34 , refers to this shift in preferences as the process by which philosophy became ‘timeless’.
30 Ibid., p. 81.
31 Empiricism and Reason seem to oppose each other in that the former relies on experience and the latter relies on context-less propositions. I include them here because they both oppose ‘the various forms of innatism and essentialism’ associated with persistent religio-political violence in Europe, Williams Michael C., Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics of International Security (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 14 , and because they both hold implications for the attractiveness of modern clock time.
32 Toulmin , Cosmopolis, p. 30 , calls this the prioritisation of ‘epistemological proofs’ over religious doctrine.
33 Williams , Culture and Security, p. 14 .
34 Ibid., p. 16.
35 Hall , National Collective Identity, pp. 77–104 .
36 Williams Michael C., The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 32 .
37 Ibid.; Osiander Andreas, ‘Before Sovereignty: Society and Politics in Ancien Régime Europe’, Review of International Studies, 27 (2001), p. 144 .
38 O'Malley Michael, Keeping Watch: A History of American Time (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1990), p. 105 ; Österud Öyvind, ‘The Narrow Gate: Entry to the Club of Sovereign States’, Review of International Studies, 23 (1997), p. 169 ; Warner Carolyn M., ‘The Political Economy of “Quasi-statehood” and the Demise of 19th Century African Politics’, Review of International Studies, 25 (1999), p. 235 . Standardisation may be understood as a liberal coordinating process, as well as an advantage in international competition, see Mattli Walter and Böthe Tim, ‘Setting International Standards: Technological Rationality or Primacy of Power?’ World Politics, 56 (2003), pp. 9, 16 .
39 Warner, ‘The Political Economy of “Quasi-statehood”’, p. 236.
40 Williams , The Realist Tradition, p. 38 . See also, Hall , National Collective Identity, pp. 24–25 ; And Hindess Barry, ‘Citizenship in the International Management of Populations’, American Behavioral Scientist, 43 (2000), pp. 1487–1493 , who has referred to the modern notion of citizenry as a form of international population management.
41 For instance, see Osiander, ‘Before Sovereignty’, p. 144.
42 Toulmin , Cosmopolis, p. 67 .
43 Ibid., p. 68.
44 Ibid., p. 107.
45 Ibid., p. 62.
46 Ibid., p. 114.
47 Ibid., p. 127.
48 Ibid., p. 108.
49 While vertical, hierarchical visions of domestic authority coexist with horizontal, autonomous relations between states in most accounts, Toulmin uses the clockwork metaphor to give an orbital explication of the modern nation-state: ‘the Roi Soleil, or Solar King, wields authority over successive circles of subjects, all of whom know their places, and keep their proper orbits’, Ibid., p. 127. This image overlaps with structural materialist theories of the international system as constituted by a core, semi-periphery, and periphery, see Wallerstein Immanuel, ‘The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 16 (1974), pp. 387–415 . Such accounts recognise their debt to an iconic rationalist, Karl Marx, but pay little homage to the cosmopolitical roots underpinning his philosophy.
50 Toulmin , Cosmopolis, pp. 127–128 , also points out that the Enlightenment version of cosmopolis argues against a secularised state because it retains the belief that ‘Everything in the natural order testifies to God's dominion over Nature. That dominion extends through the entire fabric of the world, natural or human, and is apparent on every level of experience.’
51 Evidence of the diffusion of this idea from Europe can be found in the writing of the US constitution, which was conceived by American Federalists as ‘“a machine that would go of itself”, like the deist's perfect watch’, O'Malley, Keeping Watch, p. 27.
52 Spruyt , The Sovereign State and Its Competitors, p. 36 .
53 Any references to the Church denote the Roman Catholic variety.
54 Spruyt , The Sovereign State and Its Competitors, p. 70 . See also, Foucault Michel, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon Books, 1995), p. 150 .
55 Philpott , Revolutions in Sovereignty, pp. 23–50 .
56 Ibid., p. 18, see also, p. 33.
57 Landes , Revolution in Time, p. 55 .
58 Ibid., p. 56.
59 Ibid., p. 54.
60 Ibid., p. 58.
61 Ibid., p. 51. For current purposes, I define mechanical timekeeping as utilising stored energy in moving parts. More nuanced treatments include Dohrn-van Rossum, History of the Hour; Landes, Revolution in Time; Cipolla Carlo M., Clocks and Culture, 1300–1700 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003) ; Mooij J. J. A., Time and Mind: The History of a Philosophical Problem, trans. Peter Mason (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2005) .
62 Landes , Revolution in Time, p. 51 .
63 Ibid., who also points out that a ‘tower is no place for a water clock’ because ‘lofty exposures make it very difficult to keep water from cooling and freezing’.
64 Ibid., p. 48.
65 Ibid., pp. 58–9.
66 Spruyt , The Sovereign State and Its Competitors, p. 36 .
67 Philpott , Revolutions in Sovereignty, p. 14 ; Spruyt , The Sovereign State and Its Competitors, p. 36 , claims that, as early as 1300, city-states and city-leagues represented a significant challenge to the Church, the Holy Roman Empire, and feudal obligations.
68 Philpott , Revolutions in Sovereignty, p. 125 .
69 Ibid., pp. 145–6. In addition, the growing urban masses were highly individuated, disconnected from the socio-economic predictability of rural communities, and lacking in consistent political influence, which may have made them more susceptible to Reformation efforts. On the urban character of the Reformation, see, Scribner R. W., Popular Culture and Popular Movements in Reformation Germany (Hambledon: Continuum, 1987) . For a discussion of the link between social atomisation and mass mobilisation, see Kornhauser William, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1959) .
70 Spruyt , The Sovereign State and Its Competitors, p. 150 . For a counter-argument, see Philpott , Revolutions in Sovereignty, p. 21 .
71 Landes , Revolution in Time, p. 76 .
72 Spruyt , The Sovereign State and Its Competitors, p. 74 .
73 Ibid., In this way, the rise of commerce in cities displayed the power of the market to produce specific types of citizens – in this case modern, time-conscious ones – through the lure of economic security. On the ‘civilizing’ abilities of market economies, see Hindess Barry, ‘Neo-liberal Citizenship’, Citizenship Studies, 6 (2002), p. 139 .
74 Spruyt , The Sovereign State and Its Competitors, p. 74 .
76 Landes , Revolution in Time, p. 75 .
77 See Spruyt , The Sovereign State and Its Competitors, pp. 89, 163 , for a similar treatment of the rationalisation of revenue extraction in cities.
78 Landes , Revolution in Time, p. 75 .
79 Rossum Dohrn-van, History of the Hour, p. 237 .
80 Ibid., p. 239.
81 Ibid., pp. 234–5.
82 Ibid., p. 235.
85 Ibid., p. 236.
87 Spruyt , The Sovereign State and Its Competitors, p. 105 .
88 For a critical appraisal of such accounts, see Walker, ‘State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time’, p. 450.
89 Spruyt , The Sovereign State and Its Competitors, pp. 18–19, 62 , also understands division of labour, on which capitalism is based, as partially due to the rise of cities.
90 Hall , National Collective Identity, p. 21 .
91 Ibid., p. 22.
92 Giddens , The Constitution of Society, p. 144 , contends that this understanding ‘is surely one of the most distinctive features of modern capitalism’.
93 Landes , Revolution in Time, p. 240 ; Thompson E. P., ‘Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism’, Past and Present, 38 (1967), pp. 60, 71–79 .
94 Landes , Revolution in Time, p. 240 .
95 Rossum Dohrn-van, History of the Hour, p. 8 .
96 Hanson , Time and Revolution, p. viii .
97 Giddens, quoted in Tucker Kenneth H. Jr., Anthony Giddens and Modern Social Theory (London: Sage, 1998), p. 113 . It must be noted that, in addition to capitalism, control of time became a major part of many other aspects of modern life. The treatment of factories (and later schools) in this article is not exhaustive of the sites of temporalised command-obedience during the rise of modernity. See Foucault , Discipline and Punish, pp. 149–155, 195–228 , whose examination of panopticism points out the importance of temporality in the disciplining of soldiers, students, prison inmates, and hospital patients, among others.
98 Tucker Jr., Anthony Giddens and Modern Social Theory, p. 113 .
99 Rossum Dohrn-van, History of the Hour, p. 318 .
100 Hanson , Time and Revolution, p. 50 .
101 Landes , Revolution in Time, p. 241 ; lateness was one of the most egregious errors an employee could commit, while a personal clock was often offered as a prize to productive workers.
103 Foucault , Discipline and Punish, p. 201, see also p. 150 .
104 See O'Malley, Keeping Watch.
105 This proliferation was, of course, spurred by increasingly modern manufacturing processes, completing a clockwork cycle of sorts in the industrial revolution.
106 Rossum Dohrn-van, History of the Hour, p. 317 .
107 Thompson, ‘Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism’, p. 85.
108 Hanson , Time and Revolution, p. viii .
109 Ibid., p. 52. The rise of leisure time parallels an emerging distinction between ‘private’ and ‘public’ time, see Kern , The Culture of Time and Space, p. 34 .
110 Spruyt , The Sovereign State and Its Competitors, p. 61 .
111 Harvey David, ‘Between Space and Time: Reflections on the Geographical Imagination’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 80 (1990), pp. 418–434 .
112 Hall , National Collective Identity, pp. 77–104 .
113 Landes , Revolution in Time, p. 109 .
114 Ibid., p. 110.
116 Ibid., p. 111.
117 Ibid., p. 116.
118 Ibid., p. 115.
119 Ibid., p. 168.
120 The short treatment here summarises a centuries-long process of discovery, see Ibid.; Howse Derek, Greenwich Time and the Discovery of the Longitude (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980) .
121 Landes , Revolution in Time, p. 111 . A chronometer was generally understood to require greater expense and exactitude than common timekeepers of the era, Landes , Revolution in Time, p. 310 .
122 Landes , Revolution in Time, p. 135 , and chap. 18.
123 I take ‘peripheral’ to denote cultures that were ‘pushed aside, enslaved, and in most conceivable fashions exploited’ by European ‘commercial quasi-military enterprises and the settlers that followed on their heels’, Hall , National Collective Identity, p. 100 .
124 Rossum Dohrn-van, History of the Hour, p. 323 .
125 O'Malley , Keeping Watch, p. 82 .
126 Landes , Revolution in Time, p. 303 .
127 Telegraphs had originally been installed to aid in ‘imperial defense’ and ‘as a stimulus to colonial trade’, Kesner Richard M., Economic Control and Colonial Development: Crown Colony Financial Management in the Age of Joseph Chamberlain (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981), p. 135 .
128 O'Malley , Keeping Watch, p. 105 .
129 Ibid., p. 100.
130 Landes , Revolution in Time, p. 304 .
131 O'Malley , Keeping Watch, pp. 57, 94 .
132 Ibid., p. 109.
133 Ibid., p. 107.
134 Ibid., p. 109.
135 Many signatories were also informed by successful efforts to standardise domestic ‘national times’, see Rossum Dohrn-van, History of the Hour, p. 349 .
136 Bayly C. A., The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2004), p. 17 .
137 Hall , National Collective Identity, p. 95 .
138 Ibid., p. 8, see also, p. 215.
139 Ibid., p. 231; Kesner , Economic Control and Colonial Development, p. 138 .
140 Hall , National Collective Identity, p. 37 .
141 Murphy, ‘The Sovereign State System as Political-Territorial Ideal’, p. 90.
142 Ibid., p. 98.
143 Von Laue, quoted in Hall , National Collective Identity, p. 240 .
144 Ibid., p. 233, emphasis added. Furthermore, Giddens , The Constitution of Society, p. 135 , traces the origins of modern school discipline to the emergence of clock time.
145 Ranger, quoted in Hall , National Collective Identity, p. 232 .
146 Bayly , The Birth of the Modern World, p. 17 .
147 Ibid., p. 51.
148 Ibid., p. 17. Furthermore, Strang, ‘Contested Sovereignty’, p. 37, shows how such processes also took root in non-colonised, non-Western societies as a form of ‘defensive Westernization’ which lowered the likelihood that Western states might interfere in their affairs ‘on the side of an “outraged civilization”’.
149 Hall , National Collective Identity, p. 91 .
151 Keegan John, A History of Warfare (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993) .
152 A. J. P. Taylor, quoted in Kern , The Culture of Time and Space, pp. 269–270 .
153 Ibid., pp. 270–1.
154 Ibid., p. 268.
156 Ibid., pp. 268, 264.
157 Ibid., p. 268.
158 Ibid., p. 274.
159 Ibid., pp. 279, 290, 293.
160 Ibid., p. 288.
162 Edmund Blunden, quoted in Ibid., p. 293.
163 For an account of the Paris Peace Conference that vividly recounts the tragic parlour games of territorial negotiations, see Macmillan Margaret, Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2003) .
164 Quoted in Kern , The Culture of Time and Space, p. 293 .
165 Philpott , Revolutions in Sovereignty, p. 155 .
166 Ibid., pp. 155, 36. Although see Hindess, ‘Neo-liberal Citizenship’, p. 132, who refers to this process as the ‘imposition of independence’, in which a sovereignty based on European-established borders and standards was ‘granted’ to colonies without consulting them.
167 Philpott , Revolutions in Sovereignty, pp. 93–94 .
168 Ibid., p. 194.
169 Ibid., p. 198.
170 See Ibid., p. 8; Hall , National Collective Identity, pp. 215–216 .
171 Hall , National Collective Identity, p. 240 .
172 Ferguson Niall, The War of the World: Twentieth Century Conflict and the Descent of the Wes t (New York: Penguin, 2006) .
173 See Hall Rodney Bruce and Biersteker Thomas J., The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) ; Ferguson and Mansbach, Remapping Global Politics.
174 Hutchings, ‘Happy Anniversary!’, p. 88; Hutchings , Time and World Politics, pp. 160–176 . Brent Steele and I propose ‘open time’ as an alternative to the cyclical and linear-progressive variants which we argue have dominated IR theory to date, see Hom and Steele, ‘Open Horizons’, pp. 274–80.
175 See Inayatullah Naeem and Blaney David L., International Relations and the Problem of Difference (London: Routledge, 2004) ; Blaney David L. and Inayatullah Naeem, ‘The Savage Smith and the Temporal Walls of Capitalism’, in Beate Jahn (ed.), The Classics and International Relations in Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 123–155 ; Hindess Barry, ‘The Past Is Another Culture’, International Political Sociology, 1 (2007), pp. 325–338 .
176 See Derian James der, ‘The (S)pace of International Relations: Simulation, Surveillance, and Speed’, International Studies Quarterly, 34 (1990), pp. 295–310 ; who relies heavily on the thinking of Paul Virilio, see Virilio Paul and Derian James der, The Virilio Reader (Boston: Blackwell Publishers, 1998) . While intimately connected to time, accelerationism is actually concerned with the ratio of technological convenience to increased activity, much as acceleration in the physical sense is a squared ratio of movement to time, see Rosa Hartmut, ‘Social Acceleration: Ethical and Political Consequences of a Desynchronized High-Speed Society’, Constellations, 10 (2003), pp. 3–33 ; and the forum in the same issue. In political theory, see Wolin Sheldon S., ‘What Time Is It?’ Theory & Event, 1 (1997) ; Shapiro Michael J., ‘National Times and Other Times: Re-thinking Citizenship’, Cultural Studies, 14 (2000), pp. 79–98 ; Connolly William E., Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed (Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 2002) ; Scheuerman William E., Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004) .
177 For example, economic innovations bent on speed and efficiency rely on a commodified understanding of time, Barbara Adam, ‘Comment on “Social Acceleration” by Rosa Hartmut’, Constellations, 10 (2003), p. 50 ; and the breathtaking technological innovations of the last century are unimaginable without an increasingly subdivided time unit epitomised by the idiom ‘split seconds’.
* I am especially grateful to Brent Steele for his enthusiasm and the incisive critiques he provided on several drafts while I was at the University of Kansas. Additionally, I benefited from discussions with Juliet Kaarbo and Paul D'Anieri during a presentation of this research. I am indebted to Halle O'Neal for her assistance and support throughout the project. Finally, I would like to thank the editorial team of the Review of International Studies as well as the two anonymous referees for their constructive comments. The article is much improved for all of the above contributors, while any remaining errors are my own.
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