Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-m8qmq Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-18T12:34:40.027Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The legitimacy of transnational NGOs: lessons from the experience of Transparency International in Germany and France

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 October 2013

ELLEN GUTTERMAN
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This article develops theoretical insights concerning the legitimacy of non-profit Transnational Non-Governmental Organisations (TNGOs) in global governance. The research compares the advocacy initiatives of Transparency International (TI), the leading TNGO in the international regime of anti-corruption, in Germany and France during the 1990s. The main argument is that the legitimacy of TNGOs is a relational concept: it is granted or denied in a relationship between at least two parties, in which actor attributes play a role but are not decisive. Only such a relational conception can explain why a given TNGO is granted legitimacy in one context and denied it in another. In addition, legitimacy matters. Although insufficient on its own, legitimacy is a necessary condition for effective advocacy, which TNGOs can generate endogenously. To the extent that the legitimacy of TNGOs depends on their acceptance by dominant groups and powerful decision-makers, therefore, ‘legitimate’ TNGOs may function to sustain rather than challenge the structures of power which condition global outcomes in ways that are often contrary to the goals of equality, fairness, and justice. Thus to assess the impact of TNGOs in global governance, one must examine which TNGOs have been granted (or denied) legitimacy and influence, and why.

Type
Articles
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 40 , Issue 2 , April 2014 , pp. 391 - 418
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 2013 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Willetts, Peter, Non-governmental Organizations in World Politics: The Construction of Global Governance, Global Institutions Series (New York: Routledge, 2011)Google Scholar; Risse, Thomas, ‘Transnational Actors and World Politics’, in Carlsnaes, Walter, Risse, Thomas, and Simmons, Beth (eds), Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage, 2002), pp. 255–74Google Scholar.

2 Risse, ‘Transnational Actors and World Politics’, pp. 263–4.

3 ‘TNGO’ is used here as an umbrella term, capturing a range of organisational approaches, where ‘transnational’ describes organisations that operate in and across a number of different countries. While TNGOs perform a range of functions in global governance, the focus here is on norm entrepreneurial and policy advocacy functions. This follows Collingwood, Vivien, ‘Non-Governmental Organisations, Power and Legitimacy in International Society’, Review of International Studies, 32:3 (1 July 2006), pp. 439–54, doi:10.2307/40072197, p. 441CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Risse, ‘Transnational Actors and World Politics’ provides a though overview of these factors.

5 Suchman, Mark C., ‘Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches’, The Academy of Management Review, 20:3 (1995), p. 574Google Scholar. Quoted in Avant, Deborah D., Finnemore, Martha, and Sell, Susan K. (eds), Who Governs the Globe?, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 360CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6 Fabienne Peter, ‘Political Legitimacy’, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2010), available at: {http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/legitimacy/}accessed 28 January 2013}.

7 Buchanan, Allen, ‘Political Legitimacy and Democracy’, Ethics, 112:4 (2002), p. 689CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 Buchanan, ‘Political’, p. 709.

9 Robert O. Keohane, ‘The Contingent Legitimacy of Multilateralism’, GARNET Working Paper (September 2006), available at: {http://www.garnet-eu.org/fileadmin/documents/working_papers/0906.pdf} accessed 11 July 2013, p. 2.

10 Scholte, Jan A., ‘Towards Greater Legitimacy in Global Governance’, Review of International Political Economy, 18:1 (2011), p. 111CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11 Collingwood, Vivien, ‘Non-governmental Organizations, Power, and Legitimacy in International Society’, Review of International Studies, 32:3 (2006), p. 444CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 Collingwood, Vivien, ‘State of the Art: Addressing the INGO “Legitimacy Deficit”’, Political Studies Review, 3:2 (2005), p. 178CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bukovansky, Mlada, Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in International Political Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002)Google Scholar; Franck, Thomas M., The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990)Google Scholar.

13 Bernstein, Steven, ‘Legitimacy in Intergovernmental and Non-state Global Governance’, Review of International Political Economy, 18:1 (2011), p. 18CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

14 Buchanan, Allen and Keohane, Robert O., ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’, Ethics & International Affairs, 20:4 (2006), pp. 405–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Keohane, Robert O., ‘Global Governance and Legitimacy’, Review of International Political Economy, 18:1 (2011), pp. 99–109CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

15 Clark, Ian, ‘Legitimacy in a Global Order’, Review of International Studies, 29 (Special Issue 2003), pp. 75–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

16 Scholte, ‘Towards Greater Legitimacy’, pp. 110–20.

17 Mügge, Daniel, ‘Limits of Legitimacy and the Primacy of Politics in Financial Governance’, Review of International Political Economy, 18:1 (2011), pp. 52–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18 Brasset, James and Tsingou, Eleni, ‘The Politics of legitimate Global Governance’, Review of International Political Economy, 18:1 (2011), p. 10CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

19 Brassett and Tsingou, ‘The Politics of Legitimate Global Governance’.

20 Price, Richard M., ‘Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics’, World Politics, 55:4 (11 December 2003), pp. 579–606CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hall, Rodney Bruce and Biersteker, Thomas J. (eds), The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Florini, Ann M., The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society (Carnegie Endowment, 2000)Google Scholar; Jessica T. Mathews, ‘Power Shift’, Foreign Affairs (1 January 1997), available at: {http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/52644/jessica-t-mathews/power-shift}.

21 Hall, Rodney Bruce and Biersteker, Thomas J. (eds), The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 4CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22 Lipschutz, Ronnie D. and Fogel, Cathleen, ‘“Regulation for the Rest of Us?” Global Civil Society and the Privatization of Transnatioal Regulation’, in Hall, Rodney Bruce and Biersteker, Thomas J. (eds), The Emergence of Private Auhtority in Global Governance, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 115–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

23 Hall, Rodney Bruce and Biersteker, Thomas J. (eds), The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 4–5CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

24 Price, Richard M., ‘Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics’, World Politics, 55:4 (11 December 2003), pp. 579–606CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

25 Bernstein, ‘Legitimacy’, p. 21.

26 Haunss, Sebastian, ‘Challenging Legitimacy: Repertoires of Contention, Political Claims-Making, and Collective Action Frames’, in Hurrelmann, Achim, Schneider, Steffen, and Steffek, Jens (eds), Legitimacy in an Age of Global Politics, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 160–1Google Scholar.

27 Haunss, Sebastian, ‘Challenging Legitimacy: Repertoires of Contention, Political Claims-Making, and Collective Action Frames’, in Hurrelmann, Achim, Schneider, Steffen, and Steffek, Jens, Legitimacy in an Age of Global Politics (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), p. 161Google Scholar.

28 Hugo Slim, ‘By What Authority? The Legitimacy and Accountability of Non-Governmental Organisations’, International Council on Human Rights Policy International meeting on Global Trends and Human Rights – ‘Before and After September 11’, Geneva (10–12 January 2002), pp. 6–7.

29 Miklos Marschall, ‘Legitimacy and Effectiveness: Civil Society Organizations’, Transparency International (1 November 2002).

30 Vivien Collingwood, for instance, has noted the different paths TNGOs follow as they try to exercise influence at the international level. Some TNGOs seek to engage cooperatively with governments and corporations, working within the system to influence policy. In contrast, the ‘rejectionist’ approach favoured by other NGOs maintains that a radically different set of policies than those available in the current neoliberal global order is needed to address problems of social justice, environmental degradation, poverty, or conflict. Collingwood, ‘Non-Governmental Organisations’, p. 442.

31 Slim, ‘By What Authority?’, p. 9. For Slim, these sources of an NGO's legitimacy are ‘intricately connected to specific mechanisms of accountability’, consisting primarily of a process including provisions for reporting, involving, and responding. Accountability therefore is a crucial aspect of legitimacy.

32 Walton, Oliver, ‘Conflict, Peacebuilding and NGO Legitimacy: National NGOs in Sri Lanka’, Conflict Security and Development, 8:2 (April 2008), p. 138CrossRefGoogle Scholar, citing Lister, Sarah, ‘NGO Legitimacy Technical Issue or Social Construct?’, Critique of Anthropology, 23:2 (1 June 2003), pp. 175–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Normative legitimacy refers to a basis of acceptable and desirable norms, standards, and values. Cognitive legitimacy is ‘based on goals and activities that fit with broader social understandings of what is appropriate, proper, and desirable’. Regulatory legitimacy is achieved through abiding by laws and regulations. Pragmatic legitimacy is acquired by conforming to demands for services, partnership, or by receiving private funding.

33 Klosko, George, ‘Legitimacy, Authority, and Political Obligation’, in Hurrelmann, Achim, Schneider, Steffen, and Steffek, Jens (eds), Legitimacy in an Age of Global Politics (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), pp. 57–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

34 Beisheim, Marianne, ‘NGOs Und Die (politische) Frage Nach Ihrer Legitimation. Das Beispiel Klimapolitik’, in Brunnegraber, Achim and Walk, Heike (eds), NGOs Im Prozess Der Globialisierung. Machitge Zwerge – Umstrittene Riesen (Bonn: Bundszentrale fur Politische Bildung, 2005)Google Scholar, cited in Haunss, ‘Challenging Legitimacy: Repertoires of Contention, Political Claims-Making, and Collective Action Frames’, p. 161. Beisheim's argument is that as long as TNGOs are not able to make collectively binding decisions, these actors do not need to legitimate their actions vis-à-vis society.

35 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this clear statement.

36 Neumann, Peter R., ‘Negotiating with Terrorists’, Foreign Affairs, 86:1 (2007), pp. 128–39Google Scholar.

37 Huntington, Samuel P., Political Order in Changing Societies (Yale University Press, 1968)Google Scholar; Nye, J. S., ‘Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis’, The American Political Science Review, 61:2 (1 June 1967), pp. 417–27, doi:10.2307/1953254CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

38 Finnemore, Martha and Sikkink, Kathryn, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, International Organization 52:4 (1998), pp. 887–917CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mccoy, Jennifer L. and Heckel, Heather, ‘The Emergence of a Global Anti-corruption Norm’, International Politics, 38:1 (2001), pp. 65–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

39 Transparency International, ‘Bribe Payers Index: Overview’, Transparency International – The Global Coalition Against Corruption (2013), available at: {http://www.transparency.org/research/bpi/overview}.

40 The World Bank, ‘Anticorruption Home Page’, The World Bank Group (2001), available at: {http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/index.cfm} accessed 26 June 2001. Also cited in The World Bank, ‘Empowering the Poor to Fight Corruption’, PovertyNet (2011), available at: {http://go.worldbank.org/APAR27YJ50} accessed 16 July 2013.

41 Keck, Margaret E. and Sikkink, Kathryn, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (New York: Cornell University Press, 1998)Google Scholar.

42 Transparency International, ‘Our Chapters’, Transparency International – The Global Coalition Against Corruption (2013), available at: {http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/our_chapters} accessed 16 July 2013.

43 Risse, ‘Transnational Actors and World Politics’, discusses such strategies, pp. 267–8. For a current statement of TI's principal anti-corruption strategies and activites, see Transparency International, ‘What We Do’, Transparency International – The Global Coalition Against Corruption (2013), available at: {http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo}accessed 16 July 2013.

44 George, Barbara Crutchfield, Lacey, Kathleen A., and Birmele, Jutta, ‘The 1998 OECD Convention: An Impetus for Worldwide Change’, American Business Law Journal, 37:3 (2000), p. 513CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

45 Hansjoerg Elshorst, Managing Director, Transparency International, Interview, Berlin (2 July 2001).

46 Heidenheimer, Arnold J. and Moroff, Holger, ‘Controlling Business Payoffs to Foreign Officials: The 1998 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention’, in Heidenheimer, et al., (eds), Political Corruption: Concepts & Contexts (3rd, edn, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002), p. 950Google Scholar.

47 Peter Eigen, Founder and Chairman, Transparency International, Interview, Berlin (3 September 2001).

48 Raymond Bonner, ‘The Worldly Business of Bribes: Quiet Battle is Joined’, New York Times (8 July 1999).

49 Transparency International, ‘History’, Transparency International – The Global Coalition Against Corruption (2002), available at: {http://www.transparency.org/about_ti/history.html}accessed 23 April 2002.

50 ‘Transparency International 2001 Audited Financials’, 31 December 2001, available at: {http://www.transparency.org/files/content/ouraccountability/TIS_2001AuditedFinancials.pdf}, accessed 16 July 2013. On TI's origins and early successes, see also Galtung, Frederick and Pope, Jeremy, ‘The Global Coalition against Corruption: Evaluating Transparency International’, in Schedler, Andreas, Diamond, Larry, and Plattner, Marc F. (eds), The Self-Restraining State (London: Lynne Reinner, 1999), pp. 257–82Google Scholar.

51 Werner Van Ham, Transparency International (TI) – The International TNGO Against Corruption: Strategic Positions Achieved and Challenges (A Case Study), Dissertation, Anglia Polytechnic University: Masters of Business Administration, 1998.

52 Elshorst, Interview

53 During his term as Chair of TI's advisory council, Obasanjo was elected President of Nigeria; Ocampo is a renowned independent human rights lawyer and anti-corruption activist, based in Argentina, who in 2003 became the first Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court at The Hague; Sánchez, former President of Costa Rica, won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1987.

54 Michael Wiehen, Chairman: Transparency International – Germany, Interview, Berlin (17 July 2001). For a critical account of the relationship between TI-Germany and its corporate supporters, see Claudia Eltermann, ‘Feigenblatt der Großindustrie’ (A fig leaf for big business), Der Spiegel (4 November 2003).

55 Eltermann, ‘Feigenblatt der Großindustrie’.

56 ‘Deutschland uber alles?’, Economist (4 July 1998), p. 59.

57 Eigen, Interview.

58 For a critical review of TI's anti-corruption activities, and its Source Book in particular, see Barry Hindess, ‘International Anticorruption as a Program of Normalisation’, Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal (2004).

59 Although TI-S did not devote significant material resources to the OECD anti-corruption programme, several TI leaders pursued a very active OECD-focused campaign on a volunteer basis. TI's ‘point men’ on this portfolio were Michael Wiehen of TI-Germany, Peter Rooke of TI-Australia, and Fritz Heimann of TI-USA.

60 Weihen, Interview. See also report in ‘UNTERNEHMEN Schmieren und Schmieren Lassen’, Handelsblatt (17 July 2001).

61 Hugh Williamson, ‘A Battler Against Bribery – Interview with Peter Eigen’, Financial Times (13 October 2003).

62 Transparency International, Press Release: ‘Business Leaders call on OECD Ministers to “Act against International Corruption”’, Berlin/Paris (21 May 1997). The signatory business leaders included chairmen, chief executives, and board members of the following German companies: Robert Bosch GmbH, Siemens AG, Haas Consult, Asea Brown Boveri AG, Daimler Benz AG, Hartmann & Braun, Krone AG, and Metallgesellschaft AG.

63 Eigen, Interview.

64 Eigen, Interview.

65 Wiehen, Interview.

66 Peter Eigen, quoted in Neil Jr King, ‘Coming Clean: EU Firms Await Pact on Banning Bribery with Mixed Feelings; As OECD Prepares Treaty, Members Fear Losses and Lax Enforcement; World Bank, IMF Join In’, Wall Street Journal (Europe) (23 September 1997).

67 ‘Deutschland uber alles?’ Economist (1998).

68 Wiehen, Interview.

69 Goodin, Robert E., Motivating Political Morality (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992), p. 130Google Scholar.

70 Confidential Interview, Official of the French Ministry of Finance and Economics (Direction du Trésor), Paris (21 September 2001); Confidential Interview, Official of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Sous-direction des Affaires financières internationals), Paris (24 September 2001).

71 Eigen, Interview. Though satirical, Le Canard enchaîné has a longstanding pedigree and a respected place in the French media. It currently prints roughly 700,000 copies per week and has been called ‘the only French paper that politicians in Paris truly fear’. Britta Samberg, ‘French weekly Le Canard Enchaîné ruffles feathers in Paris’, Spiegel online international (9 March 2011), available at: {http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,749665,00.html}. Le Monde diplomatique has been a key tool in the anti-globalisation movement in France. Its director-general, Bernard Cassen, was the leader of ATTAC, an anti-globalisation group with broad public support in France and Europe. In the late 1990s, the paper had a circulation of roughly 300,000 and an estimated readership of 900,000 in France alone, where 130 members of Parliament were members of ATTAC. See Gordon, Philip H. and Meunier, Sophie, The French Challenge: Adapting to Globalization (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p. 85Google Scholar.

72 Louis-Marie Horeau, ‘Les Chiffres de la Corruption Mondiale sont Impayables’, Le Canard enchaîné (2 November 1999).

73 Christian De Brie, ‘Etats, mafias et transnationales’, Le Monde diplomatique (April 2000), p. 4; Pierre Abramovici, ‘Une ONG Contesteé’, Le Monde diplomatique, p. 23.

74 Transparency International, Internal Communication (11 April 2000); Bernard Cassen, ‘Arrières pensées dans la lutte anticorruption’, Le Monde diplomatique (May 2001) and ‘Limites de la Transparence’, Le Monde diplomatique (July 2001), p. 15; Daniel Dommel, ‘Lutte Anticorruption’, Le Monde diplomatique (July 2001).

75 Member, Transparency International – Interview, Paris (22 September 2001).

76 Ibid.

77 Official, French Ministry of Finance and Economics, Interview.

78 Eigen, Interview; author's confidential interview with a member of TI-France, Paris (19 September 2001); Official, French Ministry of Justice, Interview, Paris (24 September 2001).

79 Eigen, Interview.

80 TI Newsletter (June 1995).

81 Confidential interview, Paris (22 September 2001).

82 Vincent Laurent, ‘Enquête Sur La Fondation Saint-Simon: Les Architectes Du Social-libéralisme’, Le Monde Diplomatique (1 September 1998), pp. 26–7.

83 Transparency International, internal memorandum (21 May 1997).

84 Eigen, Interview.

85 Official, French Ministry of Finance and Economics, Interview, Paris (21 September 2001).

86 Eigen, Interview.

87 Transparency International, International Communication (15 June 2001). The reports are also consistent with Gordon and Meunier's observation that ‘NGOs had never been very prominent in statist France’. Gordon and Meunier, The French Challenge, p. 96. This is rapidly changing. See also Keeler, John T. S. and Hall, Peter, ‘Interest Representation and the Politics of Protest’, in Guyomarch, Alain, Machin, Howard, Hall, Peter A., and Hayward, Jack (eds), Developments in French Politics, 2 (Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 50–67Google Scholar.

88 Eigen, Interview.

89 Author's interview with an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris (24 September 2001).

90 Assemblée Nationale de France, Rapport fait au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères sur le projet de loi, adopté par le Sénat, autorisant la ratification de la convention sur la lutte contre la corruption d'agents publics étrangers dans les transactions commerciales internationales … Rapport No. 1574 par M. Pierre Brana, Député (France: Assemblée Nationale, 12 May 1999), available at: {http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/11/rapports/r1574.asp}. The original quotation in French reads: ‘… c'est en fait la concurrence qui a été le moteur essentiel de l'action des Etats’.

91 Sénat de France, Projet de loi modifiant le code pénal et le code de procédure pénale et relatif à la lutte contre la corruption, présenté au nom de M. Lionel Jospin Premier ministre par Mme Elisabeth Guigou garde des Sceaux, ministre de la Justice., Rapport No. 179. Session ordinaire de 1998–1999, Annexe au procès-verbal de la séance du 28 janvier 1999, {http://www.senat.fr/leg/pjl98-179.html}.

92 Sénat de France, Lutte contre la corruption: Discussion d'un projet de loi, Séance du 10 novembre 1999 (France: SÉNAT, 10 November 1999), available at: {http://www.senat.fr/seances/s199911/s19991110/sc19991110011.html}.

93 Ibid.; Assemblée Nationale de France, Rapport fait au nom de la Commission des lois constitutionnelles, de la Législation et de l’ Administration générale de la République sur le projet de loi, adopté par le Sénat, modifiant le code pénal et le code de procédure pénale et relatif à la lutte contre la corruption, par M. Jacky Darne, Député., Rapport No. 2001 (France: Assemblée Nationale, 13 December 1999), available at: {http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/11/rapports/r2001.asp}.

94 Sandrier, Jean-Claude, Martin, Christian, and Veyret, Alain, Rapport D'information No 2334. Déposé En Application de L'article 145 Du Règelement Par La Commission de La Défense Nationale et Des Forces Armées Sur Le Contrôle Des Exportations D'armement., Rapport No. 2334 (France: Assemblée Nationale, Onzième législature, 25 April 2000), p. 75Google Scholar.

95 Jean-Pierre Neu, ‘Les Industriels de L'armement Montent Au Créneau Contre La Future Loi Anticorruption’, Les Echos (10 February 1999), p. 13.

96 The specific clause reads: ‘Les articles [concernant la transposition de la convention de l'OCDE] ne s'applique pas aux faits commis à l'occasion de contrats signés antérieurement à l'entrée en vigueur sur le territoire de la République de la convention visée par ces articles’. Sénat de France, Rapport Fait Au Nom de La Commission Des Lois Constitutionnelles, de Législation, Du Suffrage Universel, Du Règlement et D'administration Générale (1) Sur Le Projet de Loi Modifiant Le Code Pénal et Le Code de Procédure Pénale et Relatif à La Lutte Contre La Corruption, Par M. José Balarello Sénateur., Rapport No. 42 SÉNAT SESSION ORDINAIRE DE 1999–2000 Annexe au procès-verbal de la séance du 3 novembre 1999 (France: Sénat, 3 November 1999), available at: {http://www.senat.fr/rap/l99-042/l99-0420.html}.

97 Virginie Malingre, ‘Les députés souhaitent de renforcer le contrôle sur les contrats à l'étranger’, Le Monde (11 December 1999).

98 Virginie Malingre, ‘Polémique Sur L'application En France de La Convention de l'OCDE Contre La Corruption’, Le Monde (5 December 1999); Virginie Malingre, ‘Polémique autour du projet de loi sur la corruption’, Le Monde (15 December 1999).

99 Virginie Malingre, ‘L'Assemblée nationale amende le projet de Mme Guigou’, Le Monde (16 December 1999); Madeleine K. Albright, ‘Address to the World Economic Forum’ Davos, Switzerland (30 January 2000), available at: {http://www3.itu.int/MISSIONS/US/DAVOS/albright3.html}; laurent Mauduit, ‘Pots-de-vin et Contrats D'exportations: Enquête Sur Une Système Opaque’, Le Monde (16 December 1999), Paris edition; ‘Les députés retirent une disposition contestée du projet sur la corruption’, Le Monde (2 March 2000); Patrick Jarreau, ‘La loi française sanctionne désormais la corruption pratiquée à l'étranger’, Le Monde (8 August 2000).

100 Interview with Hansjoerg Elshorst, Berlin (July 2001).

101 Vincent Nouzille, ‘Contrats: Comment Faire Sans Pots-de-vin … L'express’, L‘Express (February 1999); Martine Orange, ‘Les enterprises craignent les effets pervers de la convention de l'OCDE’, Le Monde (16 February 1999).

102 Interview with Mark Pieth, by telephone (10 June 2002).

103 OECD Working Group report on French compliance.

104 Checkel, Jeffrey T., ‘Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe’, International Studies Quarterly, 43:1 (1 March 1999), pp. 83–114, doi:10.2307/2600966CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

105 Cortell, A. and Davis, J., ‘How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms’, International Studies Quarterly, 40 (1996), pp. 451–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kitschelt, Herbert P., ‘Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies’, British Journal of Political Science, 16:1 (1 January 1986), pp. 57–85, doi:10.2307/193981CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

106 Drugan, Joanna, House, Jim, and Waters, Sarah, ‘New voices in French politics’, Modern and Contemporary France, 12:1 (2004), pp. 3–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Stockemer, Daniel, ‘The Successful Creation of Attac France: The Role of Structure and Agency’, French Politics, 9:2 (2011), pp. 120–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Waters, Sarah, ‘Mobilising Against Globalisation: Attac and the French Intellectuals’, West European Politics, 27:5 (2004), pp. 854–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

107 Elgie, Robert, ‘The Changing French Political System’, West European Politics, 22:4 (1999), pp. 1–19CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Schmidt, Vivien A., ‘The Changing Dynamics of State-Society Relations in the Fifth Republic’, West European Politics, 22:4 (1999), pp. 141–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

108 Waters, ‘Mobilising against globalisation’.

109 Ellen Gutterman, ‘Easier Done Than Said: Transnational Bribery, Norm Resonance, and the Origins of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’, Foreign Policy Analysis (Forthcoming). Cortell and Davis, ‘How Do International Institutions Matter?’

110 Checkel, ‘Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe’.

111 Gordon and Meunier, The French Challenge: Adopting to Globalization; Guyomarch et al., Developments in Trench Politics 2.

112 Scholte, Jan A., ‘Towards Greater Legitimacy in Global Governance’, Review of International Political Economy, 18:1 (2011), pp. 110–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

113 Edwards, M., ‘Legitimacy and Values in NGOs and International Organizations: Some Sceptical Thoughts’, in Lewis, D. (ed.), International Perspectives on Voluntary Action: Reshaping the Third Sector (London: Earthscan, 1999), p. 260Google Scholar.

114 Symons, Jonathan, ‘The Legitimation of International Organisations: Examining the Identity of the Communities That Grant Legitimacy’, Review of International Studies, 37:5 (2011), pp. 2557–83CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bernstein, ‘Legitimacy’.