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Levels of analysis vs. agents and structures: part III

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 October 2010

Alexander Wendt
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Extract

I welcome this opportunity to respond to Martin Hollis and Steve Smith's ‘Beware of Gurus: Structure and Action in International Relations’, their reply to my review2 of their book, Explaining and Understanding International Relations. Their constructive comments have helped me clarify my own thinking, and I hope by extending my previous remarks in the same constructive spirit I can return the favour. In ‘Beware of Gurus’ they took up both issues I raised about their book: the relationship between the levels-of-analysis and agent-structure problems, and that between causal and interpretive explanations. In part for reasons of economy and interest, and in part being more persuaded by their comments regarding to the latter, I shall limit myself here to the former, taking issue in particular with what I see as their reduction of the agent-structure problem to one of levels-of-analysis.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 18 , Issue 2 , April 1992 , pp. 181 - 185
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1992

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References

1 Hollis, M. and Smith, S.. ‘Beware of Gurus: Structure and Action in International Relations’. Review of International Studies, 17, (1991), pp. 393–410CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Wendt, A., ‘Bridging the Theory/Meta-Theory Gap in International Relations’, Review of International Studies, 17 (1991), pp. 383-92CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 Hollis, M. and Smith, S., Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford, 1989)Google Scholar.

4 Waltz, K., Theory of International Politics (Boston, 1979)Google Scholar.

5 See, for example, Hollis and Smith, ‘Gurus’, pp. 14, 15.

6 Waltz, Theory, pp. 74–7.

7 Waltz, Theory, p. 91.

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12 Hollis and Smith,'Gurus’, p. 15.

13 Hollis and Smith, ‘Gurus’, p. 20.

14 Wendt, A., ‘Anarchy is what States make of it: The Social Construction of Power Polities’, International Organization, 46 (1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

15 A good example of such reasoning is John Mearsheimer's recent argument about the emerging threats to European stability in the wake of the end of the Cold War. See Mearsheimer, J., ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’, International Security, 15 (1990), pp. 5–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar.