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Critique Without Critics?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 September 2008

Marcelo Dascal
Marcelo Dascal*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy Tel Aviv University
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The argument

Two dominant models of criticism are identified and analyzed. One is selfconsciously normative. It conceives of criticism as subject to strict logical rules. The other views itself as essentially descriptive and accounts for the critical activity in terms of social factors. In spite of their different origins and purposes, it is argued that both models share a reductionistic thrust, which minimizes the role of the critic qua agent. It is further agreed that neither provides an adequate account of critical activity and its role in science.

Type
Research Article
Information
Science in Context , Volume 10 , Issue 1 , Spring 1997 , pp. 39 - 62
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1997

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