Hostname: page-component-89b8bd64d-sd5qd Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-05-06T10:37:50.532Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Empathy, Simulation, and Narrative

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 July 2012

Shaun Gallagher*
Affiliation:
University of Memphis (USA) and University of Hertfordshire (UK) E-mail: s.gallagher@memphis.edu

Argument

A number of theorists have proposed simulation theories of empathy. A review of these theories shows that, despite the fact that one version of the simulation theory can avoid a number of problems associated with such approaches, there are further reasons to doubt whether simulation actually explains empathy. A high-level simulation account of empathy, distinguished from the simulation theory of mindreading, can avoid problems associated with low-level (neural) simulationist accounts; but it fails to adequately address two other problems: the diversity problem and the starting problem. It is argued that a narrative approach to empathy obviates all these problems and offers a more parsimonious account.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable