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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 February 2009
When we raise the question of whether the pleasures of the human body are as valuable as those of the human mind — whether, for example, pushpin is as good as poetry — it is quite possible that people will disagree on their answers. But we would also expect most people to agree with the assertion that the death of a human being would generally be a bad thing; whilst his continuing to live would be a good thing. Furthermore, we would expect most people to concede immediately that the death of five human beings is a worse evil than the death of one single individual: all other things being equal, I hasten to add. It seems to follow now, on the basis of this commonly held view, that saving the lives of five people, who would be doomed to a certain death without an intervention on the part of another, would be morally right, if not praiseworthy, even if the action which is necessary to save those five lives would also entail the death of another person. To liven up the proceedings, if you will pardon the expression in this context, let me put to you this specific case:
organs distributed. In that case, there would be one dead but five saved.’
1 This case, and the former, are taken from Harman, G., The Nature of Morality. An Introduction to Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 3–4Google Scholar.
2 See, e.g. Glover, J., Causing Death and Saving Lives (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977), p. 114Google Scholar; Harris, J., ‘The Survival Lottery’, in Steinbock, B. (ed.), Killing and Letting Die (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1980), pp. 150, 153, 155Google Scholar.
3 See Hanink, J. G., ‘Some Light on Double Effect’, Analysis 35 (1974–1975), p. 150Google Scholar; cf. Mangan, J. T., ‘An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect’, Theological Studies 10 (1949), pp. 41–61 (esp. pp. 60–61)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Grisez, G. G., ‘Towards a Consistent Natural Law Ethics of Killing’, The American Journal of Jurisprudence, 15(1970), p. 78CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
4 See, e.g. the contributions of J. Casey (‘Killing and Letting Die’), P. Foot (‘The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect’), J. G. Murphy (‘Is Killing the Innocent Absolutely Immoral?’) and R. Trammell (‘Saving Life and Taking Life’), in Steinbock, op. cit.
5 Bennett, J., ‘Whatever the Consequences’, in Steinbock, op. cit., pp. 109–127Google Scholar; first published in Analysis 26 (1966), pp. 83–102.
6 Bennett, op. cit., pp. 109–111. Bennett's terms are ‘conservative’ and ‘conservatism’ instead of ‘absolutist’ and ‘absolutism’.
7 Op. cit., pp. 112–120.
8 See, for a discussion of the different positions here, Locke, D., ‘The Choice between Lives’, Philosophy 57 (1982), pp. 461–468CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
9 Bennett, op. cit., p. 113.
10 Foot, P., ‘The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect’, in Steinbock, op. cit., pp. 156–165Google Scholar; first published in The Oxford Review, No. 5 (1967).
11 Op. cit., pp. 159–160.
12 Op. cit., p. 160.
13 Op. cit., p. 162.
14 Op. cit., p. 163.
15 Op. cit., p. 163.
16 Op. cit., pp. 164–165.
17 D. Locke, op. cit., p. 470.
18 Op. cit., p. 471.
19 Op. cit., p. 471.
20 Anscombe, G. E. M., ‘War and Murder’, in Rachels, J. (ed.), Moral Problems. A Collection of Philosophical Essays (New York and London: Harper and Row, 2nd ed., 1975), p. 289Google Scholar.
21 Op. cit., p. 294.
22 Richards, N., ‘Double Effect and Moral Character’, Mind 93 (1984), p. 382Google Scholar.
23 Op. cit., pp. 382–383.
24 Cf. Kenny, A., Will, Freedom and Power (Oxford; Blackwell, 1975), p. 43Google Scholar: ‘Practical reasoning, it appears to me, can very well be looked at as a process of passing from one fiat to another according to rules, just as theoretical reasoning consists in passing from one assertoric sentence to another according to rules.’
25 Nicomachean Ethics, 1124a, pp. 27–31.
26 I offer no opinion here on the question of which way of putting the case is to be preferred. In other words, I do not want to take sides for or against the identity theory of action. See, for a discussion of this theory, Goldman, A. I., A Theory of Human Action (Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 1–10Google Scholar.
27 See, e.g. von Wright, G. H., Norm and Action. A Logical Inquiry (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), pp. 39–41Google Scholar; and Kenny, op. cit., pp. 54–55. Note that there is a logical relation between an action and its result. The action: A opens the window, cannot be truly ascribed to A, unless the window is opening (changes from closed to open), i.e. unless the action's result occurs. The relation between an action and its consequence, on the other hand, is not logical. The consequence of A's action of opening the window may be that the temperature in his car falls. There is a causal, not a logical, relation between his opening the window and the falling of the temperature in his car.
28 See Richards, op. cit., p. 394. This is apparently also the view of H. L. A. Hart, see Foot, op. cit., p. 157.
29 Cf. Foot, op. cit., pp. 157–158.
30 Nagel, Th., Mortal Questions (Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 61Google Scholar.
31 Cf. Richards, op. cit., p. 395.
32 D. Locke, op. cit., pp. 472–473. Locke speaks of ‘direct’ instead of ‘intentional’ killing.
33 Richards, op. cit., pp. 385–387.
34 Op. cit., pp. 390–391.
35 Op. cit., pp. 391–392.
36 Op. cit., p. 393.
37 Op. cit., p. 393.
38 See, e.g., Foot, op. cit., p. 164; Locke, op. cit., p. 472.
39 Richards, op. cit., pp. 387, 393.
40 Geach, P., God and the Soul (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 129Google Scholar.
