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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 August 2009
John Milbank is one of the most recent and arguably most radical proponents of an understanding of nature as graced. This article critically examines Milbank's understanding of nature and grace, specifically as elaborated within his reading of Thomas Aquinas. In the first part I will outline Aquinas's most direct discussions of nature and grace in the Summa Theologica, drawing attention to several central, albeit subtle, distinctions that these contain. In the second and third parts, I will examine Milbank's reading of Aquinas in Truth in Aquinas, and examine whether it adequately reflects and negotiates Aquinas's distinctions. On this basis I will argue Milbank's reading, while drawing attention to some important and often neglected areas of Aquinas's thought, ultimately remains limited.
1 Milbank, John and Pitstock, Catherine, Truth in Aquinas (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 39CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
2 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (2nd and rev. edn, 1920; hereafter ST), I. II, 109. 2). Online edn, 2006, see http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2.htm (accessed Dec. 2006).
3 Ibid., p. 44.
4 Ibid., p. 21.
5 While Truth in Aquinas was co-authored with Catherine Pitstock the particular essay that I am focusing on, ‘Truth in Vision’, was written by Milbank. It was earlier published as ‘Intensities’, Modern Theology 15/4 (Oct. 1999).
6 Milbank and Pitstock, Truth in Aquinas, p. 19.
7 Unless otherwise indicated all quotes in the proceeding discussion come from ST I. II, 109. 1 (and I have followed the same format for the next two sections). The main translation of the Summa I have used is that by the Dominican Fathers of the English Province found online: www.newadvent.org/summa/ (accessed Nov. 2006).
8 Again, it might be concluded that insofar that nature is not ‘wholly spoiled’ (109. 2), a certain love for God remains possible for the fallen creature, albeit in only an imperfect and incomplete manner.
9 Milbank and Pitstock, Truth in Aquinas, p. 20.
10 Ibid., p. 21.
11 Ibid.
12 This is a summary of Milbank's argument, Milbank does not set out his position in so straightforward a manner. In outlining Milbank's position I have also drawn in a number of passages from Aquinas, some of which Milbank cites and others of which he alludes to more generally.
13 Ibid., p. 22.
14 Ibid., p. 23.
15 Ibid., p. 22.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid., p. 21.
18 Ibid., p. 22.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., p. 24.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., p. 21.
24 Ibid., p. 39.
25 Ibid., p. 23.
26 Ibid., p. 38.
27 Ibid., p. 23.
28 Ibid., p. 39.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., p. 23.
31 Ibid., p. 21.
32 Ibid., p. 42.
33 On this issue see Fran O'Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2005), p. 25.
34 Ibid., p. 19.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Milbank identifies a dualism of precisely this type as emerging, not in Aquinas, but in the later work of John Duns Scotus; specifically in Scotus’ understanding that ‘finite things univocally “are” as much as the infinite’. In Milbank's reading ‘being as univocal’ allows existence to become conceivable in isolation from God, which in turn breaks down any necessary and going participation of creatures in the divine. Ibid., p. 42.
38 See also Porter, Jean, Nature as Reason: A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004), pp. 378–400Google Scholar.
